




‘PERSONAL’ PROPERTY: FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR 
GENETIC INFORMATION 
Ayesha Rasheed* 
Like much of the Constitution, the Fourth Amendment presumes property rights but does not 
define them. Its text protects individuals against unreasonable government searches and seizures 
of their “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” but sets no contours for these four categories. 
Since the Founding, those unfixed boundaries have allowed courts to gradually shift the Fourth 
Amendment’s property protections to include such modern phenomena as GPS location data 
and cell phone cloud storage. 
Such flexibility is both an aspiration and an inevitability of the common law, which evolves over 
time via judicial precedent and custom. Indeed, property rights, themselves a creature of common 
law, are both often founded in privacy interests and have evolved as those interests expand and 
contract, across contexts and across time. 
Advances in genetics, biotechnology, and computing should compel courts to recognize that the 
common law of property is evolving yet again. Though the Supreme Court has never decided the 
question, it is widely accepted that individuals retain a substantial expectation of privacy in their 
genetic data, even if not always in the physical samples from which that information is extracted. 
Just as expectations of domestic solicitude and private ownership founded the rights underlying 
longstanding property interests like nuisance and trespass, so too should individuals be able to 
take refuge from government intrusion within the homes of their own bodies. 
Drawing on other property rights that are built upon privacy interests, this Article argues that we 
have—and the law should recognize—a limited property right in genetic information. This property 
right would give individuals a sorely-needed right to exclude others from their intimate data, 
would more accurately reflect the ways in which individuals, private companies, and research 
institutions transfer and trade in genetic materials, and would help to clarify the scope of various 
legal protections that turn on both property and privacy interests, such as the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 *  J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; M.Sc., University of Oxford; B.S. with 
Honors, Stanford University.  For encouraging me to write and providing invaluable feedback 
throughout this process, I owe deep thanks to Professor Tejas Narechania at Berkeley Law.  I am 
also indebted to my family and friends for their support, and to Sabrina McGraw for her sharp eye 
and good cheer.  Errors and oversights are my own. Moreover, I wrote this Article as a student -  the 
views and opinions herein do not represent those of my employer. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Before giving a lecture at King’s College in 1951, biochemist Rosalind 
Franklin reflected on her x-ray crystallography photographs of DNA.
1
  While 
doing so, she underlined the following observations in her notes: “Big helix in 
several chains, phosphates on outside, phosphate-phosphate inter-helical 
bonds disrupted by water.”
2 
Franklin’s photographs were ultimately the key to decoding the helical 
structure of DNA and subsequently, launched a revolution in biochemistry, 
molecular biology, and genetics.  Today, DNA’s twisted double-helix can be 
unzipped within hours to reveal a mind-boggling array of highly personal 
 
 1 See ANNE SAYRE, ROSALIND FRANKLIN AND DNA 128 (2000). 
 2 Id. 
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Because genetic data is ubiquitous, essentially unalterable, and inherently 
identifiable, this hypersensitive and uniquely permanent information surely 
falls within the sacred “privacies of life,”
4
 such as one’s home, that are 
protected by American law.  Or, at minimum, such data’s unanticipated 
exposure to and exploitation by the government implicates the “right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person.”
5
  Yet, privacy has 
long proved an elusive right to define, and an even harder one for harmed 
individuals to defend in court.
6
  This has contributed to the threadbare status 
of legal protections for genetic information in the United States.  At present, 
no federal law comprehensively guarantees an individual’s genetic privacy.
7
  
State laws, where they exist, are vague and patchy.
8
 
A road to legal protection for genetic privacy already exists—it just needs to 
be formalized.  Throughout history, the common law has recognized new 
 
 3 International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL 
ORG. (OCT. 16, 2003), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17720&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html; see also Genetic Testing, 
MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/genetic-testing/about/pac-20384827 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2019). 
 4 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 5 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).  Note also that advances in DNA 
technology have made anonymization—even when an individual abstains from DNA testing— virtually 
impossible.  See, e.g., Kristen V. Brown, A Researcher Needed Three Hours to Identify Me From 
My DNA, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 12, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-12/a-researcher-needed-three-hours-to-identify-
me-from-my-dna (“Anyone can be exposed, whether or not they’ve made their own DNA public.  
One family member sharing such personal information can expose multiple generations on their 
family tree.”). 
 6 See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW ch. 2A (6th 
ed. 2018) (describing diverse perspectives on the definitions of “privacy” and corresponding 
difficulties faced by litigants making privacy claims).  
 7 See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, Ellen Wright Clayton & Frances Lawrenz, LawSeqSM: Building a Sound 
Legal Foundation for Translating Genomics into Clinical Application, CONSORTIUM ON L. & 
VALUES HEALTH, ENV’T & LIFE SCIS., https://consortium.umn.edu/research/lawseqsm-building-
sound-legal-foundation-translating-genomics-clinical-application (last visited Nov. 1, 2019) (collecting 
into a searchable public database all federal and state laws, regulations, official guidance, and 
professional standards that regulate the field of genomics).  While the 2008 Genetic Information and 
Nondiscrimination Act clarified that genetic data could theoretically be subject to the federal Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, no law “truly protects [genetic] 
privacy.”  Genetic Information Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/genetic-
information-privacy (last visited Oct. 18, 2019); see also Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (prohibiting discrimination in employment and health 
insurance on the basis of genetic markers). 
 8 See supra note 7. 
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property rights that are founded in privacy interests, with the scope of privacy 
expected defining the limits of a corresponding property right.  No less, 
privacy-informed property rights have long provided individuals with some of 
the law’s sturdiest routes to adjudicated relief.  Indeed, “the language of 
property collapses back into communal perceptions of the boundary to be 
drawn between liberty and privacy” and, at its heart, “is reducible to a dialogue 
about moral and personal space, about the mutual frontier between autonomy 
and vulnerability, between social accommodation and immunity from 
predation.”
9
  Arguably, these deep ties between property rights and privacy 




Strong privacy interests in one’s genetic information confer a limited 
property right in that information.  Upon recognizing that property right, 
courts applying the Fourth Amendment’s robust protections for personal 
property can safeguard sensitive DNA data from government misuse.  In this 
way, the reality of how informative genetic information is and how easy it has 
become to collect and analyze can be reconciled with the fundamental 
protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 
While this Article is not the first to propose a limited property right in 
genetic information,
11
 it is the first to argue that industry practices and legal 
precedent indicate that such a right already essentially exists.  As such, this 
Article is an application of progressive property theory to a particular context, 
rather than an exhaustive exploration of the theory itself.  Part I describes 
similar instances where courts have recognized property rights stemming from 
privacy interests; namely, the doctrines of trespass and nuisance.  Accordingly, 
courts can and should update common law understandings of personal 
property interests to reflect present custom and public conscience regarding 
 
 9 See KEVIN GRAY & SUSAN FRANCIS GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW 89 (5th ed. 2009) (footnote 
omitted). 
 10 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting against warrantless searches and seizures of private property); 
id. amend. V (prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without just compensation); id. 
amend. XIV (prohibiting the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process). 
 11 See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Genetic Property, 105 GEO. L.J. 1, 7, 10 (2016) (arguing against property 
rights in genetic data in the context of biomedical research and instead advocating for rules similar to 
tort liability); Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877, 879 (2015) 
(proposing that a property right analogous to tenancy by the entirety may be useful for genetic 
information because tenancy by the entirety conceptualizes two persons as one and genetic 
information is likewise shared by multiple individuals due to relatedness);  Jessica L. Roberts, 
Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2018) (exploring how 
progressive property theory may address deontological concerns about genetic ownership rights more 
usefully than neoclassical economic theory does). 
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genetic information.  Part II then sets out the five types of categories that 
comprise genetic information (original biological samples, purified DNA, raw 
sequencing data, and inferences drawn from the raw data both for individuals 
and populations) to establish a taxonomy that courts and advocates might use 
to prevent analytical confusion.  Moreover, as evidenced by contracts 
governing their use and extant case law, each of the five categories has different 
attributes and should therefore be ascribed property rights with varying 
contours.  Part III subsequently explores the doctrinal implications of 
recognizing limited property rights in genetic information, with emphasis on 
the vigorous Fourth Amendment protections that are afforded to property 
interests.  It also highlights concerns that courts and legislators should be 
mindful of to prevent a genetic property right from encouraging 
dehumanization
12
 or exerting undue influence on social interactions. 
I. PRECEDENT IN PROPERTY LAW 
To begin, it is worth asking: “By what authority may a court provide 
protection to information that legislators have not?” and “Why property law?”  
Part I provides a brief answer. 
The basic contrast between statutory law and common law is one of speed 
and malleability.  Statutory law can be passed or discarded quickly, while the 
common law is extrapolated gradually from judges’ rulings and juries’ verdicts.  
The latter’s slow pace of change and accumulation of diverse cases from which 
to observe changing social norms enables the common law to recognize new 
rights and “grow[] to the demands of new times and circumstances.”
13
  Thus, 
it is perfectly proper for a court to formalize new causes of action or modify 
interests in existing common law rights. 
The Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with which this work is concerned 
reflects the common law’s spirit of evolution.  To preserve individuals’ Fourth 
Amendment protections, the Supreme Court has repeatedly responded to 
technological advances and corresponding shifts in social views by adapting 
the rules governing government searches and seizures.  While those revisions 
 
 12 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1987) (arguing that 
healthy personhood and social structuring requires certain aspects of life to be exempt from being 
priced, bought, and sold). 
 13 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 124 (1904); see also MICHAEL 
ARNHEIM, PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMON LAW 136 (2004) (setting out common law principles 
relating to evolving legal rights and obligations, noting that “the concept of rights has been at the centre 
of legal discourse for centuries”). 
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did not necessarily create new property rights, for centuries “Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass[.]”
14
 
This deeply rooted connection to property law,
15
 which is itself a creature 
of common law, and doctrinal haziness resulting from the Court’s move away 
from property-based understandings of the Fourth Amendment,
16
 makes 
property law a rich and useful way of examining genetic privacy.  Moreover, 
property-based understandings of the Fourth Amendment remain valuable 
even in the face of technological advances the Founders could have never 
envisaged.  For instance, regarding GPS tracking, the Court clarified in Jones 
that the reasonable expectation of privacy test supplemented trespass-based 
jurisprudence rather than replaced it.
17
  And, in his Carpenter dissent, Justice 
Neil Gorsuch suggested the defendant might have had an “ancient” property 
interest in the contents of his cell phone data, though he did not elaborate 




Suffice to say, much 
of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relates to property law, and 
the current Court may be particularly receptive to arguments that utilize 
property-based doctrinal foundations. 
To illustrate the dynamic nature of property law underlying the Fourth 
Amendment, Section I.A describes existing privacy-based property rights such 
as actions for nuisance and trespass.  It highlights the adaptable nature of the 
common law and shows that privacy was a theme in property cases long before 
this nation existed.  In addition, it posits that contemporary debates over the 
scope of nuisance and trespass likewise reflect the importance of privacy 
 
 14 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 
(2001) (surveying Supreme Court cases that illustrate the influence of common-law trespass on Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
 15 See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (“The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to 
property . . . .”). 
 16 See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, The Common Law Endures in the Fourth Amendment, 27 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 85, 85 (2018) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s move away from the common-
law understanding of property rights and towards a reasonable expectation of privacy test has created 
an erratic doctrine); see also Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
357, 362, 385 (2019) (observing that the Court’s most recent update to the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test in Carpenter v. United States “reinvents” the test and “turns the third-party doctrine inside 
out,” in addition to advocating a new rule of “technological equivalence” that may have far-reaching 
effects). 
 17 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411–12 (explaining that the Katz “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test” is not 
“the exclusive test” and would apply to situations not involving trespass). 
 18 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2269, 2272 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  Gorsuch’s 
dissent reads more like a concurrence, given that he ultimately agreed with the majority that the seizure 
of the cell location records violates the Fourth Amendment.  See id. at 2272 (noting that Carpenter 
relied exclusively on Katz’s reasonable expectations argument, instead of invoking common law 
doctrines, to his detriment). 
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considerations.  Section I.B then examines one of the only major cases to have 
addressed whether biological material can be considered real property.
19
  It 
notes that while Moore v. Regents of the University of California held that 
Moore did not have property rights in his spleen or pharmaceutical products 
developed from research on his organs, the case does not preclude recognizing 
a property right in genetic information.  Thus, the Court should view Moore 
as both an invitation to evolve its law governing property in human biological 
materials and as an outdated case that should not remain the touchstone for 
related future questions, given the vast changes in genetics and biotechnology 
that have occurred in the thirty years since Moore. 
A. Existing Privacy-Oriented Property Rights 
At common law, property rights are often founded in privacy interests, with 
the scope of privacy expected defining the limits of a corresponding property 
right.  Importantly, neither these property rights (discussed below in 
Subsection 1) nor privacy interests (discussed below in Subsection 2) are static.  
The nature of property and privacy rights makes clear that it is appropriate for 
courts to recognize changes in common law property rights, if and when the 
privacy interests underlying them shift. 
Two long-established causes of action illustrate both historical foundations 
and the way that evolving expectations of privacy have altered the contours of 
property rights.  The first is trespass, which is one of property law’s oldest 
vehicles for ensuring that an individual is left alone by his neighbors.  Looking 
to some of the first recorded trespass cases at English common law as well as 
current debates over new forms of trespass like light trespass and aerial 
trespass, the evolution of trespass law shows that privacy interests are what 
differentiate instances where courts have recognized that a trespass occurred 
from those where they did not.  The same privacy-linked trajectory is even 
more true of nuisance law, and further evidenced by the seeming convergence 
of nuisance with the law of trespass.  In all, Section I.A proposes that property 
rights at common law have always been dynamic, that privacy is a traditional 
element of property law,
20
 and therefore that courts would not be acting 
 
 19 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480–82 (Cal. 1990) (addressing whether 
plaintiff, whose cancer cells defendants used to develop a lucrative cell line, states a cause of action). 
 20 Contra Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of 
Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 737 (2004) (arguing that privacy and property are 
“fundamentally different concepts” because property connotes control over things that can be 
“disaggregated or alienable from the self,” while privacy instead focuses on “control over access to 
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radically if they explicitly recognized privacy’s role in the development of 
property law. 
1. Dynamic Property Rights at Common Law 
Centuries old, the laws of trespass and of nuisance provide time-tested 
examples of property rights that exemplify the common law’s responsiveness 
to changing social mores. 
First, we turn to trespass, a strict liability cause of action whose origins 
appear significantly different from modern debates over intangible trespasses, 
such as those incurred by drones and other aircraft, computer software, and 
intrusive lights.   
From its outset, trespass exemplified the dynamic nature of a property 
right at common law.  Initially, it emerged haphazardly from the historical 
records of medieval England, where it was one of three civil actions that later 
subsumed the others.
21
  Intended “from the first [to have] a connotation wide 
enough to have embraced both the others,”
22 
common law trespass seems to 
have been a flexible mechanism used to protect the relatively inflexible English 
precept that a man’s house is his castle.
23
  Blackstone’s oft-cited eighteenth-
century overview of English law, for instance, noted that trespass could broadly 
include any trespass against “the law of nature, of society, or of the country in 
which we live[,] whether it relates to a man’s person, or his property[,]” even 
though it was more popularly considered in a “confined sense . . . [that] 
signifies no more than an entry on another man’s ground without a lawful 
authority, and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real 
property.”
24 
But despite its malleable nature, trespass provided robust protection of 
personal property and dwelling areas: it has always been a strict liability cause 
 
the self”).  Suter’s views echo those of Margaret Jane Radin’s in that they worry about the 
commodification and quantification of semi-tangible and intangible things that are deeply personal.  
See supra note 12.  However, at least in the context of both nuisance and trespass, as well as Fourth 
Amendment violations, property models exist in part to directly address the kind of dignitary harms 
Suter discusses when genetic privacy is at risk. 
 21 See George F. Deiser, The Development of Principle in Trespass, 27 YALE L.J. 220, 225 (1917) 
(noting how, by the reign of Henry II, trespass had absorbed two other civil actions of tort, the assizes 
of novel disseisin and of nuisance). 
22  Id. at 277. 
 23 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223 (expressing that the law of England regards 
the immunity of a man’s house as his castle).  
 24 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *208–09  
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of action
25
 and, in certain circumstances, a crime.  Early English cases made 
clear that while the actual harm caused to the plaintiff may have been difficult 
to define, so long as the sanctity of private land was violated even in part, the 
law of trespass would provide staunch protection.  Entick v. Carrington, an 
English trespass case from 1765, oft-cited by the Supreme Court in Fourth 
Amendment cases, illustrates the principle.
26
  There, the court stated, “No man 
can set his foot upon my ground without my licence, but he is liable to an 
action [for trespass], though the damage be nothing.”
27 
 This remained evident 
during the American colonial period, even as trespass developed into a 
catchall that enabled legal redress against a host of actions “going beyond what 
is lawful” with regards to intrusions in and around real property.
28
  
Trespass thus served to protect plaintiffs from unauthorized entry onto 
their property regardless of the exact form of and justifications for the tort over 
time.  Moreover, the underlying sense that trespass was about something more 
than mere possession of property
 
matters for two reasons: it illustrates the fluid 
nature of what is popularly considered to be a bright-line tort, and as the next 
Subsection will expand upon, that trespass protected real property as a proxy 
for other social values such as privacy.
29 
Contemporary trespass law further demonstrates the dynamic nature of 
trespass at common law.  Today, increasingly invasive technologies have 
forced the doctrine of trespass to evolve again in order to protect landowners’ 
changing views of how they own land and live upon it.  Previously, the invasion 
of personal space required the intruder’s physical presence; now, that does not 
necessarily hold true. 
Aerial trespass offers one case study.  In a seeming contradiction, time and 
again courts have refused to uphold trespass claims when certain kinds of 
aircrafts, such as passenger airplanes, have crossed over individuals’ 
 
 25 See, e.g., Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co. [1874] LR 10 CP 10, 12 (Eng.) (noting that “[i]t has been decided 
over and over again that a trespass cannot be measured; whether it be an inch or an ell, it is a trespass 
all the same.”). 
 26 See Entick v. Carrington [1765] EWHC (Ch) KB J98, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 808 (Eng.) (addressing a 
trespass suit in which defendants ransacked plaintiff’s home and pilfered priceless documents). 
 27 Id. at 817. 
 28 Thomas, supra note 16, at 93 (citing 5 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 151 
(1766)); see George E. Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass, 33 YALE L.J. 799, 800 
(1924) (detailing the early history of trespass actions); see also Purviance v. Angus, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 
180, 183–184 (Pa. High Ct. Errors & App. 1786) (noting that all parties to trespass are liable, whether 
their actions are negligent, ignorant, or willful). 
 29 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) (noting that 
“an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies the owner’s 
property”). 
556 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:3 
properties, though they have found actionable claims when other aircrafts like 
personal drones do the same.
30
  As a threshold matter, before holdings such 
as in Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport31 and United States v. Causby,32 the 
common law doctrine of ad coelum
33
 provided landowners with full property 
rights over both the subterranean areas beneath their land and the sky above 
it.  But, despite discarding the ad coelum doctrine, the Court in Causby held 
that overhead flight by military planes at eighty-three feet constituted trespass 
because “the superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land 
that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself.”34  
Similarly, courts have found that airline flights above 1,000 feet could not 
constitute a trespass, nor the flight path necessary for attaining and declining 
from that altitude,
35
 though the Restatement suggests that over-flights are 
trespass if: (1) they are in the immediate reaches of the land, and (2) they 
interfere with the use and enjoyment of the land.
36  
While “immediate reaches” 
is yet undefined by statute, “[i]n the ordinary case, flight at 500 feet or more 
above the surface is not within the ‘immediate reaches,’ while flight within 50 
feet, which interferes with actual use, clearly is, and flight within 150 feet, which 
also so interferes, may present a question of fact.”
37  
The contours of aerial 
trespass thus continue to evolve in parallel with changing methods of aerial 
invasions and uses of land. 
Trespass by means of intrusive lights, such as unwanted projection displays 
and spotlights, pose similar challenges to the letter of trespass law.  For 
centuries, light from “wax candles, and whale-oil lamps, and then kerosene” 
could not actually do very much damage to another’s property.38 Accordingly, 
courts’ limiting of trespass to physical invasions went largely unchallenged until 
 
 30 That is, excluding contact at a molecular or atomic level, which light and electricity would of course 
have even if such contact is not visible to the naked eye. 
 31 See Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936) (declining to recognize a rule for 
trespass under which landowners may “stake out” the air above their land). 
 32 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (declaring that the ad coelum doctrine “has 
no place in the modern world” in light of the growth of passenger air travel). 
 33 From the Latin, “cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum,” meaning “whoever owns the soil owns 
also to the sky and to the depths.” 
 34 Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–65. 
 35 See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 814–15 (2d Cir. 1956) (noting 
an “express exception” for take-off and landing of planes under 1,000 feet). 
 36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (Am. L. Inst. 1965). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 15 Loc. 159 v. Great Wash Park, LLC, No. 
67453, 2016 WL 4499940, at *7 (Nev. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2016); see Maureen E. Brady, Property 
and Projection, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1162–65 (2020) (summarizing the finding in the Great 
Wash Park case). 
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the proliferation of light bulbs in the early 1900s.
39
  Combined with scientific 
advances in physics, state courts soon became ensnared in intricate debates to 
determine whether light could conduct a tangible trespass, and if not, how to 
justify a hitherto unrecognized intangible trespass.
40
  Courts’ eventual reliance 
on the latter
 41
 again highlights the dynamic nature of the common law, even in 
a realm as seemingly inert as trespass. 
Nuisance, another well-established property right at common law, has 
similarly dynamic qualities.  While the origins of nuisance are also murky,
42
 
“the underlying problem of the bad neighbour” has carried legal consequences 
since at least the twelfth century.
43
  As best we can tell, at its outset, the assize 
of novel disseisin was a means for England’s King Henry II to prevent violence 
accompanying the “spasmodic upheaval and unjust results of private quarrels” 
that often occurred between medieval neighbors.
44
  Over time, this writ evolved 
such that, “[t]o be actionable, a nuisance had to result in both injuria (legal 
injury) and damnum (material damage).”45  Importantly, “[a] necessary element 
of injuria was omne id quod non iure fit (‘anything wrongfully done’),” a term 
which seems to have covered all interferences that affected the “natural rights” 




Those natural rights were tethered 
directly to possession of property, and “could not be taken away by express 
grant or prescription.”
47
 Thus, from its early days, nuisance law had in mind 
fundamental human rights that were, in the case of private nuisance, often tied 
to the same kind of rights of exclusion, personal autonomy, and privacy that 
trespass was. 
Further demonstrating its adaptable nature, local sensibilities sometimes 
mattered more in assessing nuisance cases than even other legal frameworks 
when courts were assembling a hierarchy of customs for purposes of the 
reasonableness calculus.  Butter v. Heathby, for example, a 1766 nuisance 
 
 39 See Brady, supra note 38, at 1150–1154 (detailing early light-related nuisance suits). 
 40 See id. at 1156–1158 (describing efforts of courts to determine whether light could conduct trespass). 
 41 See, e.g., 169 E. 69th St. Corp. v. Leland, 594 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992) (“A source of 
light can be the basis of a cause of action in trespass.” (citing Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland 
Meadows, 198 P.2d 847 (Or. 1948)). 
 42 See Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property 
Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 766 (1979) (noting that nuisances began 
as a term for “annoyances [that] were probably remedied on an ad hoc basis by the many local courts 
of medieval England”). 
 43 Janet Loengard, The Assize of Nuisance: Origins of An Action at Common Law, 37 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 144, 144 (1978). 
 44 Id. at 144–45. 
 45 Coquillette, supra note 42, at 769. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 769–70. 
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case regarding tithe notices, presented the issue of how local parish customs 
stacked up against both the common law and general ecclesiastical law.
48
  
Speaking for the court, Lord Justice Mansfield placed local customs above 
other considerations, stating that it did not matter “[w]hether this custom be 
good in law, or not”—only that, “it is the law of the land, here in this parish.”
49
  
Accordingly, tithe payment notices were to continue being posted as they had 
been previously, despite the practice being in direct contradiction to prevailing 
national law at the time.
50 
Today, nuisance takes two forms: public nuisance and private nuisance.  
The former is “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the 
general public.”
51  
Examples include access to roads and waterways, as well as 
to grazing pastures and clean air.  Private nuisance, on the other hand, covers 
unreasonable interference with an individual’s private interest in the use and 
enjoyment of land.
 52   
But, what kinds of actions are unreasonable depends on 
a number of different factors, and there is no single test for nuisance despite 
wide acceptance of the Restatement (Second) of Torts approach.
 
 However, 
the various approaches share three traits.  First, the “guiding principle is sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, meaning that one should use one’s own 
property in such a way as not to injure the property of another.”
53
  Second, 
“the harm done is the chief element,” and third, that harm is done indirectly.”
54
  
Finally, and perhaps most notably, nuisance “is always a tort against land, and 
the plaintiff’s action must always be founded upon his interest in the land.”
55
  
In this way, nuisance provides an even more flexible means than trespass to 
account for changing social attitudes and uses of property, though both torts’ 
dynamic natures exemplify the common law’s ability to evolve over time. 
2. Dynamic Privacy Interests, Protected by Property Rights 
Notably, the doctrines of trespass and nuisance evolved along two parallel 
axes of change: one is the slow, but ever-changing body of common law of 
which they are part, and the other reflects the dynamic nature of the privacy 
interests these two common law doctrines protect.  This Subsection again 
 
 48 Butter v. Heathby (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1154. 
 49 Id. at 1154–1155. 
 50 See id. (finding that the challenged custom was reasonable and should be enforced). 
 51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (Am. L. Inst. 1965). 
 52 Id. at § 821D. 
 53 Martin A. Hogg, The Very Private Life of the Right to Privacy, in HECTOR L. MACQUEEN, 2 
PRIVACY AND PROPERTY (HUME PAPERS ON PUBLIC POLICY), NO. 3, at 18 (1994). 
 54 Id. at 2. 
 55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 40, topic 1, intro. note.  
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revisits trespass and nuisance in order to show that privacy interests are a core 
value of these property rights, and that shifts in the scope of those rights likely 
corresponds to changing social views regarding privacy. 
Beginning once more with trespass, it is crucial to note that trespass 
doctrine has always protected privacy interests by nature of the personal 
security that in rem property confers upon its possessors.  Because “possession 
of land confers, at common law, an entitlement to dictate the terms on which 
access may be enjoyed (if at all) by others,”
56 
trespass shares a common 
ancestor of personal autonomy with basic notions of individual self-
determination and privacy.  Members of the Supreme Court have recognized 
this.
57
  And, supporting this is the fact that “trespass to land is ‘essentially a 
wrong against possession, not against ownership.’”
58
  The tort could therefore 
attach, in theory, to any person who possessed anything or any place—its legal 
protection followed the individual, not ownership of title.
59
  Moreover, “not 
every unauthorized entry of another’s property is actionable.”
60
  As an 
example, courts have upheld what would otherwise be a trespass even when 
permission to enter is obtained by fraud.
61
  This suggests that to some degree, 
permission is dispositive; that once an individual has allowed someone into 
their personal space, their property rights ensuring solicitude there are less 
actionable. 
But, modern courts’ willingness to embrace the dynamic nature of 
common law property law rights in order to recognize intangible trespasses, 
despite continuing reliance on the unchanged language of the law (i.e. which 
requires “entry” onto property),
62 
has created its own issues.  Indeed, courts 
 
 56 See GRAY & GRAY, supra note 9, at 1260. 
 57 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 190 n.10 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of 
the purposes of the law of real property . . . is to define and enforce privacy interests . . . .”); see also 
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 13 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (noting that the law of property 
influences our “shared social expectations” about privacy). 
 58 See GRAY & GRAY, supra note 9, at 1261 (discussing entitlement to sue in trespass). 
 59 See id. at 1260. 
 60 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Privacy Interest in Property, 167 U. PENN. L. REV. 
869, 905 (2019). 
 61 See id. at 905–06 (“[C]ourts have sanctioned physical entry into other persons’ property when 
permission to enter was gained by fraud.”). 
 62 See Brady, supra note 38, at 1184–93 (arguing that the increasingly economic focus of trespass and 
nuisance law has left a gap in the legal protection of real property); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 450 (1982) (“Literally read, the Court’s test opens the door 
to endless metaphysical struggles over whether or not an individual’s property has been ‘physically’ 
touched.  It was precisely to avoid ‘permit[ting] technicalities of form to dictate consequences of 
substance,’ that the Court abandoned a ‘physical contacts’ test in the first place.” (alterations in 
original) (citation omitted)). 
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have made a flurry of seemingly inconsistent rulings when confronted with 
invasive technologies that have no physical contact
63
 with real property; namely 
aerial drones, computer software, and intrusive lights.  This Article argues that 
the privacy interests that have always undergirded trespass law are once again 
surging to the surface as courts make rulings based on social policy and 
unwritten norms about invasiveness, in light of the unhelpful letter of the law 
and its emphasis on physical intrusions. 
Take aerial trespass; while it is not immediately apparent why some flight 
heights are trespasses but not others, the Restatement’s direct borrowing from 
nuisance law (i.e. “the use and enjoyment of land”) in an attempt to clarify 
when aerial trespass occurs suggests that privacy interests may be a key factor.  
Flights by jumbo jets at high altitudes are thus unlikely to constitute trespass: 
to have so many passengers look upon so many potential plaintiffs somehow 
seems less invasive and intimate than flights flown closer to the ground (that 
presumably have clearer visibility of land), or flights by smaller aircraft (which 
would fly lower, and have fewer occupants).  But, because the sphere of 
protection given to personal property has uncertain physical dimensions, it is 
unclear whether flights by small, unmanned drones could indeed constitute 
trespass.  After all, drones, which are capable of incredible video storage and 
high image resolution, would seem to be both intrusive in the same manner as 
smaller aircraft and invasive in a new way given its novel surveillance 
capabilities.
64 
A deluge of new and draft laws banning drones in certain areas for privacy 
reasons
65
 suggests that privacy interests should prohibit invasive drone over-
flight.  Arkansas and Louisiana, for example, have several laws addressing 
drones, including one that criminalizes the use of drones to invade spaces 
where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
66
  The language 
of such laws against drone voyeurism echoes that of trespass doctrine 
generally—it does not appear to matter whether the intended victim was aware 
 
 63 That is, excluding contact at a molecular or atomic level, which light and electricity would of course 
have even if such contact is not visible to the naked eye. 
 64 See generally Hillary B. Farber, Keep Out! The Efficacy of Trespass, Nuisance and Privacy Torts as 
Applied to Drones, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359 (2017) (considering new legal questions posed by 
drones).  
 65 See id. at 365 (“[L]awmakers are feverishly proposing drone specific legislation.”); Brian Farkas, 
What to Do When Your Neighbor Has a Drone, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/what-do-when-your-neighbor-has-
drone.html#:~:text=Contact%20Your%20Neighbor&text=Reach%20out%20by%20phone%20or,his
%20or%20her%20own%20backyard (last visited Mar. 18, 2021) (providing an overview on current 
law governing drones). 
 66 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-101(b) (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283 (2020). 
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of the intrusion.
67
  So long as privacy is knowingly violated by the offender, he 
would be criminally liable in much the same manner that trespassers are liable 
regardless of their intent in entering another’s land.  Relatedly, Florida’s 
Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2019 prohibits the use of 
drones to observe “an owner, tenant, occupant, invitee, or licensee of privately 
owned real property . . . to obtain information about their identity, habits, 
conduct, movements, or whereabouts,” as well as the mere observation of 
“unique identifying features or . . . occupancy” of any “privately owned real 
property.”
68
  Here, the nexus between privacy and property is evident, and the 
limits of each inform the other. 
Other forms of intangible trespass also indicate that privacy interests can 
and do help define the scope of established property rights.  In fact, a recent 
case of light trespass via computer fiber optics cables expressly noted that while 
“[t]he transmission of light signals across the Plaintiffs’ land is an intangible 
invasion. . . .  [I]t is not the basis for the alleged trespass; it is the cable’s use 
that the Plaintiffs have put at issue.”
69 
 Indeed, the repeated edging of trespass 
towards the language of nuisance law
70
 suggests again that privacy interests 
underlying protection of people upon their property is what is truly at issue.  
Similar issues arise when dealing with “digital trespasses” that occur in 
augmented reality (“AR”). In such cases, courts have, to date, focused on relief 
for the physical side effects of actions taken in AR, even as they and 
commentators simultaneously acknowledge that messages conveyed by digital 
projections in AR may intrude upon privacy upon one’s real property or right 
to control how that property is perceived by others.
71
 
Finally, the burgeoning action of computer trespass illustrates that less 
“tangible” trespasses often boil down to a privacy-related issue: distinguishing 
between authorized and unauthorized access to another’s personal spaces.  
With computer trespass, as with non-home physical spaces such as a store, not 
all computer spaces seem as private as others.
72
  Thus, the statutes concerning 
this form of trespass are somewhat hazily written to get at the crux of the tort 
 
 67 See sources cited supra note 66. 
 68 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50(2)(e) (West 2020). 
 69 In re WorldCom, Inc., 320 B.R. 772, 780 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted). 
 70 See Brady, supra note 38, at 17 (discussing how Martin suggests that light can be the subject of trespass 
if it causes “significant or substantial and unreasonable” interference with the use of one’s land). 
 71 See Declan T. Conroy, Property Rights in Augmented Reality, 24 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 17, 25 (2017) (discussing the Holocaust’s Museum’s concern that appearance of a “poison-gas 
type Pokémon” within the museum via the Pokémon Go app undermined the Museum’s ability to 
“solemnize and honor [Holocaust victims’] history”). 
 72 See Orin Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1152 (2016) (considering 
trespass norms of commercial stores). 
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or crime, which is to prevent hackers crossing “cyberproperty” boundaries
73
 
rather than wayward neighbors ignoring physical fences or property lines.  For 
example, the Washington state statute on computer trespass, which like the 
federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, states that a trespass occurs 
“if the person, without authorization, intentionally gains access to a computer 
system or electronic database of another.”
74
  The statute reflects the difficulty 
common across all forms of trespass regarding what may entail authorization, 
but otherwise, stresses access in the same way that the strict liability of physical 
trespass always has.  Though there has not been much litigation to help courts 
define computer trespass norms yet,
75
 it seems reasonably likely that intuitions 
about which types of computers and computer networks are intended by their 
owners to be kept most private will inform the way the doctrine gets shaped. 
The development of the tort of nuisance even more readily demonstrates 
that privacy has always been an element of property law.  Several early English 
cases make clear that the actions at issue were often pushed into 
unreasonableness (thus becoming a nuisance) when privacy and security in 
personal spaces was at stake.  Take, for instance, Aldred’s Case, a case from 
1610 wherein William Aldred claimed that his neighbor Thomas Benton had 
built and maintained a pig sty too close to his home.
 76
  The court found for 
Aldred, holding that the smell from the sty was enough to deprive Aldred of 
his property and personal dignity.
77
  Specifically, the court set down a sweeping 
rule that emphasized an individual’s right to be safe, secure, and comfortable 
in his own personal space.
78
  
Considered collectively, the common factors between various tests for 
nuisance show that “use and enjoyment” implies more than mere possession 
of land: it speaks directly to an individual’s right to exist in a personal area as 
he sees fit, without the direct judgment or disruption of others—in a word, his 
privacy.  The open-ended nature of nuisance’s multi-factor inquiry has thus 
long allowed nuisance doctrine to accommodate a variety of circumstances as 
 
 73 See Conroy, supra note 71, at 37–38 (describing various ways in which courts have recognized real 
property rights in cyberspace, including but not limited to certain kinds of computer networks, drives, 
and servers). 
 74 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.90.040(1) (2016); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 
(2018). 
 75 See Kerr, supra note 72, at 1155 (“Computer trespass norms remain uncertain.”). 
 76 William Aldred’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1558; 4 CO. REP. 57a, 57b. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See id. (stating that a man has “no right to maintain a structure upon his own land, which, by reason 
of disgusting smells, loud or unusual noises, thick smoke, noxious vapors, the jarring of machinery, 
or the unwarrantable collection of flies, renders the occupancy of adjoining property dangerous, 
intolerable, or even uncomfortable to its tenants”). 
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they arise, or to encompass existing acts and items that are used in newly 
interfering ways.  Because of this, courts have remarked that nuisance claims 
are not uncommonly brought simultaneously with direct actions in privacy law 
such as intrusion upon seclusion and invasion of privacy.
79
 
Perhaps for this reason, courts and scholars alike have been more 
receptive to nuisance than trespass to remedy what might otherwise be called 
invasions of privacy caused by new technologies.  As a first example, in 2016 
a Nevada court examining a trespass claim based upon unwanted light 
projections rejected the trespass claim but suggested that had it been brought 
as a nuisance suit, the claim may have survived appellate review.
80
  Similarly, 
though it settled and thus left open its legal questions, a consolidated set of 
class action lawsuits were filed in the Northern District of California alleging 
that placing virtual objects (i.e. Pokéstops within the AR game Pokémon Go) 
on or near private property without permission directed players to trespass, 
thus creating a nuisance.
81
  Along the same lines, Mark Lemley and Eugene 
Volokh have posited that if nuisance law is modified to “[treat] VR ‘places’ as 
tantamount to ‘uses of land’ which nuisance law protects[,]” tort liability would 
be plausible.
82 
B. An Invitation to Evolve: Moore v. Regents of California 
Though it is nearly thirty years old, Moore v. Regents of California remains 
the foundational case for considering property rights in genetic materials.
83
  
However, Moore is outdated, binding only in California, and does not 
 
 79 See, e.g., Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2017) (observing 
that a nuisance claim may be available to a plaintiff alleging unconsented telemarketing via text 
message).  
 80 See Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 15 Local 159 v. Great Wash Park, LLC, 
No. 67453, 2016 WL 4499940, at *9 (Nev. App. Ct. July 29, 2016) (Tao, J., concurring) (“In some 
cases, projecting artificial light onto someone else’s property might constitute an actionable private 
nuisance.  The district court’s order contains no factual findings regarding whether such a nuisance 
occurred in this case, and so that question is not before us.”) 
 81 See Consol. Amended Class Action Complaint at 3–4, In re Pokémon Go Nuisance Litig., No. 3:16-
cv-04300-JD (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 25, 2016); Matt Shields & Susannah Benjamin, Pokémon Go 
Class Action Settles as Augmented Reality Legal Questions Remain, HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
(Apr. 12, 2019), https://harvardjsel.com/2019/04/pokemon-go-class-action-settles-as-augmented-
reality-legal-questions-remain (explaining that the trespass and nuisance issues surrounding apps like 
Pokémon Go remain uncertain following the settlement).  
 82 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1051, 1101 (2018). 
 83 See, e.g., Greenberg v. Mia. Child.’s Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 
2003) (echoing Moore by holding that property interests in one’s tissues are lost upon donation to 
medical research, thus barring claims of conversion). 
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preclude recognizing a limited property right in genetic information.  
Moreover, it applies to an entirely different context, i.e., the buying and selling 
of body parts and human cells for commercial development, rather than law 
enforcement collection and use of genetic materials under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Though a handful of subsequent cases have addressed claims 
regarding property ownership in human biological materials, none save Moore 
has engaged at length with the underlying property theory, and all appear to 
cite Moore merely as shorthand for courts’ reticence to extend property rights.   
In Moore, the California Supreme Court refused to uphold Moore ’s 
claimed property rights in his excised spleen.  Moore suffered from hairy-cell 
leukemia, and had consented to surgical removal of his spleen.  But prior to 
the procedure, doctors did not tell him that cells from his spleen would 
provide lucrative “competitive, commercial, and scientific advantages.”
84 
Moore sued the defendants under thirteen causes of action, including 
conversion.  Because conversion is a tort that “protects against interference 
with possessory and ownership interests in personal property”: Moore thus 
argued that he “continued to own his cells following their removal from his 




The court flatly rejected 
that argument based upon two core reflections.  First, in their estimation, 
legislation in California had weakened a patient ’s right of control over his 
excised tissues so greatly that any remaining rights in that tissue were no longer 
“property” rights.
86  
Second, public policy demanded Moore’s property rights 
remain unrecognized.  The court worried that if biological materials could be 
bought and sold, human dignity would be harmed and life would become 
further
87 
commoditized, in addition to imposing potentially crushing confusion 
over title and legal liability upon academic research institutions and an “infant 
biotechnology industry.”
88 
 Excluding intellectual property cases debating the 
extent to which cellular and genetic materials can be patented, no cases seem 
 
 84 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481–82 (Cal. 1990) (observing that those 
cells were later patented and sold to commercial development for roughly $1 million). 
 85 Id. at 487. 
 86 Id. at 491–92. 
 87 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 12, at 1851–52 (arguing that healthy personhood and social structuring 
requires certain aspects of life to be exempt from being priced, bought, and sold).  Body parts are 
also, obviously, bought and sold regularly on the black market, and priced as part of insurance and 
worker’s compensation plans.  The going black market price of a spleen in 2012 was estimated to be 
$508.  See Casey Chan, Here’s How Much Body Parts Cost on the Black Market, GIZMODO (Apr. 
23, 2012, 9:00 PM), https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2012/04/heres-how-much-body-parts-cost-on-the-
black-market/?. 
 88 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 493. 
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to have revisited these property issues in detail since Moore was decided in 
1990.
89 
Moore should no longer be viewed as an impediment to recognizing a 
limited genetic property right.  Turning first to the court’s policy arguments, 
there does seem to be a general fear that recognizing property rights of any 
sort in cell and tissue materials enables a flood of extensive litigation, wherein 
plaintiffs seek monetary compensation for research and innovation based in 
part upon their bodily substances.
90  
But on the timescale of technological 
advances in the biosciences, Moore is grounded in a bygone era.  The “infant 
biotechnology industry” the Court was so keen to protect is now well 
positioned to defend its own interests: the medical biotechnology sector alone 
is worth at least $150 billion a year,
91 
and technologies such as CRISPR that 
were enabled by the completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003
92 
 have 
made research exponentially cheaper and faster than could have been 
imagined when Moore was decided three decades ago.93  Looking solely at 
 
 89 One ongoing case in Florida state court may change this, though it seems unlikely given that the case 
is entering its second decade of litigation and shows no signs of imminent resolution on the merits.  
See generally Peerenboom v. Perlmutter, No. 502013CA015257, 2014 WL 713133 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Feb. 24, 2014) (describing the aforementioned case).  Growing out of a bizarre tennis court spat 
between billionaires, in Peerenboom, attorneys for the Perlmutters have expanded their conversion 
claim to include not just the collection of Perlmutter’s DNA, but importantly, the “analyzing and 
testing” of it.  Id.  The court in that case agreed to let the case continue past Peerenboom’s motion 
to dismiss, though it did not clarify what kind of property interests sufficient to support conversion 
were present in the “intangible rights to their genetic information” that the “Perlmutters plainly 
retain.”  Id.  Thus, so far, the case only serves to highlight that there is a strong privacy interest in 
genetic information, and how difficult it is to use conversion (which is a strict liability tort) to resolve 
ownership disputes for material as complex as genetic information.  Several other cases have also 
discussed ownership interests in whole human biological materials (i.e., not genetic information 
directly), albeit cursorily.  See, e.g., Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007) (deeming 
analysis of ownership interests in prostate cancer research samples as unnecessary in the context of 
their “gift” to the university). 
 90 See, e.g., Mary Taylor Danforth, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Patient’s Right to a Portion of the 
Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 179, 181–82 (1988) (proposing a legal approach to patients’ property 
rights in their cells that does not stifle research by threat of litigation). 
 91 Moore, 793 P.2d at 493; Troy Segal, Biotech vs. Pharmaceuticals: What’s the Difference?, 
INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/033115/what-difference-
between-biotechnology-company-and-pharmaceutical-company.asp (discussing the industry). 
 92 The Project fully sequenced the human genome for the first time, and had taken over a decade of 
concerted international effort to complete.  See A Brief Guide to Genomics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME 
RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/A-Brief-Guide-to-Genomics (last 
visited June 4, 2021).  
 93 See Brad Plumer, Eliza Barclay, Julia Belluz & Umair Irfan, A Simple Guide to CRISPR, One of 
the Biggest Science Stories of the Decade, VOX (Dec. 27, 2018, 2:45 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/7/23/17594864/crispr-cas9-gene-editing (stating that the Cas9 enzyme the 
CRISPR technique uses to edit genes at the single base pair level  can be had for as little as $75 and 
may only take a few hours to use). 
566 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:3 
CRISPR, for example, in 2008 there were fewer than one hundred papers on 
the topic; ten years later, in 2018, there are more than 17,000 published papers 
expanding on and applying the gene editing technique.
94 
 Moreover, modern 
technology makes tracking participant consent much easier and faster than it 
did when Moore was decided, thus significantly lessening uncertainty about 
possible future litigants over title. 
The court’s concerns about human dignity, however, remain relevant, 
especially in the context of the Fourth Amendment’s protections against 
unreasonable government search and seizure.  But where the court worried 
that to hold that patients do not have the ultimate power to control the destiny 
of their tissues “would open the door to a massive invasion of human privacy 
and dignity in the name of medical progress[,]”
95 
its fears came to pass anyway.  
Now, arguably, the inability under law for individuals to slow corporate 
exploitation of their bodily materials has led to an utter lack of genetic privacy.
96  
Moreover, the court’s distress about commoditizing and disrespecting human 
life echoes recurring debates that run through the whole tapestry of the history 
of medicine, maybe most obviously in the cases they allude to that evaluate 
the propriety of using human cadavers for anatomical and surgical study.  
Above all, the court’s discussion of the many cases recognizing rights of 
dominion over one’s own body and the interests one has therein suggest that 
legal protection of a limited property right in genetic material is not precluded.  
The lower court had noted “these rights and interests are so akin to property 





nowhere did reviewing court engage with that observation, or clearly explain 
what those property rights were beyond noting that “some limited right to 
control the use of excised cells” perhaps survived even after the applicable 
California statute established use and deletion requirements.
98
  Therefore the 
stumbling blocks appear to have been extant legislation and the demands of a 
burgeoning biotechnology industry, which, taken together, prioritized 
economic development over the autonomy interests and corresponding sense 
of ownership one has in their own body.  
 
 94 See id. (quoting Jennifer Doudna of the University of California, Berkeley, one of the scientists who 
discovered the CRISPR/Cas9 system, as saying, “This has become such a fast-moving field that I even 
have trouble keeping up now”). 
 95 Moore, 793 P.2d at 491 (citation omitted).  
 96 See Genetic Information Privacy, supra note 7 (“So what can protect the privacy of genetic data in 
such a world?  Not much, actually.  Some laws limit how the information can be used, but none truly 
protects privacy.”). 
 97 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 98 Moore, 793 P.2d at 492. 
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II. GENETIC PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Under extant American tort, criminal, and contract law regimes, true 
genetic privacy looks elusive.  And so, we turn to the dynamic nature of 
common law property rights to protect what they cannot.  Indeed, industry 
usage already implies property interests in genetic information and courts 
would be doing no more than their traditional duty in recognizing that. 
The leading theory of property conceives of property as a “bundle of 
sticks,” wherein the sticks represent distinct rights that individuals assert in 
relation to things against one another, and which may divided among owners.
99
  
Originated by Wesley Hohfeld and other legal realists of the early twentieth 
century,
100
 the “bundle of rights” that may be exercised with respect to an object 
principally include the “rights to possess the property, to use the property, to 
exclude others from the property, and to dispose of the property by sale or by 
gift.”
101 
 And, the list of theoretical sticks can be expanded, including rights of 
personal use and enjoyment, rights to the income from use by others, rights to 
security, a duty to refrain from using the object in ways that harm other, and 
residual rights on the reversion of lapsed ownership rights held by others.
102 
Other rights may also exist, but the crucial thing is that different property 
objects can be accompanied by different selections of rights sets, and the 
weighting of those rights relative to one another is likewise malleable.  While 
traditionally, the right to exclude has been the one most treasured at common 
law when real property is involved, it is by no means the only or most 
important of the abovementioned rights.  In his dissent in Moore, California 
Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk mentioned the bundle of sticks approach 
by name, and noted that, “[f]or a variety of policy reasons, the law limits or 
even forbids the exercise of certain rights over certain forms of property.”
103 
 In 
this way, the Moore Court could have held the cells to be Moore’s property, 
but instead used the cited legislation and policy arguments to shape how that 
property may or may not be alienable. 
This speaks to a more central question regarding novel types of property: 
to assign an appropriate set of rights to an object, that object must be clearly 
 
 99 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers 
for Merrill and Smith, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 215, 216 (2011) (explaining the benefits and limitations 
of the “bundle of sticks” metaphor). 
 100    Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 Vt. L. Rev. 247, 251 (2007).  
 101 Moore, 793 P.2d at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
 102 See JASPER A. BOVENBERG, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BLOOD, GENES & DATA: NATURALLY YOURS? 
127 (2006) (listing the rights included in the core “bundle”). 
 103 Moore, 793 P.2d at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
568 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:3 
defined.  In this Part, Section II.A highlights that there is no such unitary thing 
as “genetic information,” though this Article has itself used that term.  Rather, 
the term encompasses five distinct objects, each tier of which Section II.B will 
argue requires a different set of property rights sticks in its bundle so as to 
avoid doctrinal confusion and self-sabotaging privacy laws. 
A. A Taxonomy of “Genetic Information” 
While he does not seem to have fully realized it, part of the challenge of 
applying Justice Mosk’s bundle-of-sticks approach in Moore was Moore ’s 
overbroad definition of his property.  Moore grounded his conversion claim 
in a dispute over his “Blood and Bodily Substances,” which included inter alia 
his blood, his bodily tissues, his cells, and the cell lines derived therefrom.
104 
 
Such a sweeping definition set Moore up to fail.  Most notably, the commercial 
and research byproducts produced from his cells had fundamentally different 
qualities and required additional effort in their distillation; to lump those in 
with his baser materials, so to speak, impaired any real ability of the Court to 
recognize that Moore may have had a limited property interest because the 
object defined included too much. 
The same is true for  “genetic information” as the term is currently used. 
Thus, this Section provides a sorely needed taxonomy of different types of 
“information” likely involved when “genetic information” is referenced.  To 
protect individual privacy and ensure constitutional government searches, it is 
essential for courts, advocates, and the lay public to understand the distinct 
limitations and physical contours of each type, and examine what that might 
mean for making legal arguments.  Hopefully, this effort to clarify how genetic 
concepts relate to each other will also encourage lawyers and courts to not 
assume background knowledge in advanced biology, and spell out clearly in 
arguments and orders what it is they are actually discussing. 
I propose five core classifications, the first two of which can probably be 
collapsed together under most circumstances for purposes of Fourth 
Amendment search doctrine.  I list them in order of least to most scientifically 
“processed,” which also tracks the order in which they are collected from 
human beings.  This means that a later category cannot exist without having at 
some point been processed through preceding ones. 
The five categories are as follows: (1) source biological materials, including 
saliva, blood, and whole tissues; (2) extracted and purified DNA; (3) 
sequenced DNA, in whole or in part; and information gleaned from 
 
 104 Id. at 506. 
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sequenced DNA at both an (4) individual level and (5) at aggregate, i.e. 
population-wide. 
1. Biological Source Materials 
This category consists of all possible origin sources from which to extract 
DNA directly from an individual. 
It is in some ways the broadest, because it would include anything from 
entire limbs or whole organs down to samples of whole cells.  Blood and saliva 
are usually the most common source materials for genomic study, but hair and 
urine are also viable sources of DNA for genomic analysis.
105
 
It is notable that the trend is towards literally microscopic amounts of 
biological materials needed for collection.  Large amounts of source biological 
material are no longer necessary for extracting DNA that can be used for 
genetic studies.  In fact, high-quality DNA can be extracted from as little as 
half of one mL of fresh or frozen human blood.
106  
For scale, police in the field 
currently collect about 20 mL when drawing blood for a DUI test,
107
 and the 
popular genetic testing kits sold by 23andMe require about 2 mL
 
of saliva to 
be collected.
108
  And, albeit still limited in utility, marked improvements are in 
the works for even single cell genome analysis.
109
  Such advances suggest that 
property in such objects cannot be defined purely by size, and that courts and 
scholars must instead look to the properties of the object—here, that it can 
enable further genetic analysis—when scrutinizing arguments. 
Nor must these materials be harvested from the living.  Though DNA 
begins to degrade upon a person’s death and quickly becomes unusable for 
gene sequencing, advances in Next Generation Sequencing have enabled 
scientists to extract DNA “from preserved tissue (in most cases bone and 
 
 105 Souvik Ghatak, Rajendra Bose Muthukumaran & Senthil Kumar Nachimuthu, A Simple Method of 
Genomic DNA Extraction from Human Samples for PCR-RFLP Analysis, 24 J. BIOMOLECULAR 
TECHS. 224, 227 (2013). 
 106 See Pokhraj Guha, Avishek Das, Somit Dutta & Tapas Kumar Chaudhuri, A Rapid and Efficient 
DNA Extraction Protocol from Fresh and Frozen Human Blood Samples, 32 J. CLINICAL LAB’Y 
ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2017) (detailing a method to extract DNA from small samples of blood). 
 107 See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. § 1005-2(6.1.1.6) (2019) (noting that blood specimen must be collected 
directly into two 10ml sterile tubes). 
 108 Providing Saliva Sample for DNA Test Kit, 23ANDME, https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-
us/articles/202904530 (last visited Nov. 29, 2019). 
 109 See Christiane Bäumer, Evelyn Fisch, Holger Wedler, Frank Reinecke & Christian Korfhage, 
Exploring DNA Quality of Single Cells for Genome Analysis with Simultaneous Whole-Genome 
Amplification, 8 SCI. REPS. 1, 2 (2018) (discussing the possibility of genome amplification from small 
samples including single cells). 
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teeth) that is recovered from either ancient or semi-ancient” remains.
110 
Corresponding advances in the means of preserving tissues and cell cultures 
may also increase the amount of time after death during which gene 
sequencing can be done.
111
  Thus, post-mortem property rights may become 
more of an issue as the science in this area continues to advance. 
2. Extracted DNA 
Once biological source materials are removed from an individual, all 
further categories require some degree of additional human effort to come 
into creation. 
The next stage after sample collection, and what this Article classifies as 
category two, comprises DNA that has been extracted from cells in the source 
material and purified.  DNA in this category is thus ready for sequencing and 
further analysis, but like the materials in category one, does not reveal sensitive 
personal information without further processing. 
3. Sequenced DNA 
Once DNA has been purified and processed, it can be sequenced by many 
different methods, all of which ultimately produce a raw data file of a person’s 
unique sequence of nucleotide bases (A, C, G, T). 
Before surveying the most common types of DNA sequencing, additional 
background information on genetic science may be helpful.  The human 
genome is encoded in double-stranded DNA molecules consisting of 
complementary nucleotide chains.  Though the human genome contains 
about six billion nucleotide bases, approximately 99% of any two human 
genomes are the same.  What remains constitutes the “genetic variation” that 
makes an individual human unique.  The most common type of genetic 
variant is a single nucleotide polymorphism (“SNP”).
112
  Each SNP represents 
a difference in a single DNA building block; for example, a SNP may replace 
the nucleotide cytosine (C) with the nucleotide thymine (T) in a certain stretch 
 
 110 Daniel Fernandes et al., The Identification of a 1916 Irish Rebel: New Approach for Estimating 
Relatedness from Low Coverage Homozygous Genomes, 7 SCI. REPS. 1, 1 (2017). 
 111 See Sebastian Giwa et al., The Promise of Organ and Tissue Preservation to Transform Medicine, 
35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 530, 531 (2017) (“By overcoming these institutional barriers and 
facilitating coordinated and cross-disciplinary research, it is now possible to dramatically accelerate 
progress in organ and tissue preservation using existing knowledge from a diverse array of fields.”). 
 112 When spoken, a SNP is commonly pronounced “snip.” 
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of DNA.
113
  SNPs thus serve as genetic markers that help researchers locate 
genes. 
Because SNPs “have a direct influence on our physical attributes (e.g., hair 
color, eye color, blood type) . . . [and] predispositions to various diseases,”
114
  
SNP testing is the most common form of genetic test that an individual may 
take.  Largely, this is because direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies 
like 23andMe and Ancestry load saliva samples onto SNP chips to quickly and 
cheaply “spot-check” a person’s sample against a preset collection of SNPs 
known to be involved in certain traits.
115 
 In this way, the entirety of an 
individual’s DNA is not sequenced; only the SNP regions of greatest interest 
to whomever is doing the sequencing. 
Whole-genome sequencing, on the other hand, is exactly what it sounds 
like.  These tests aim to sequence an individual’s complete genetic sequence, 
and accordingly produce much larger data files that can be studied in greater 
depth.  Though these tests used to be prohibitively expensive for average 
consumers, Veritas, the market leader for whole genome sequencing, recently 
dropped the cost of its tests to $599 and anticipates soon pricing tests between 
$100-200 so as to compete directly with 23andMe and Ancestry.
116
 
A plethora of other types of genetic tests also exist,
117
 not of all which 
require DNA sequencing and most of which are relatively less popular 
amongst the lay public than the tests described above.  Some, like newborn 
screening for genetic disorders that is required for all children born in the 
United States, generally look for the presence or absence of various 
compounds in the blood or of entire chromosomes rather than sequencing 
 
 113 What Are Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs)?, MEDLINE PLUS, 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/snp (last updated Sept. 18, 2020). 
 114 See id. at 101.  By the time of publication, the number of known SNPs will likely be outdated, the 
number of research community-validated SNPs on the NCBI webpage has grown from 
approximately 50 million in 2015 to over 335 million at the time of this writing in Sept. 26, 2018.  
That webpage is located at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/SNP/snp_summary.cgi. 
 115 Tina Hesman Saey, An Open Book, SCI. NEWS, May 26, 2018, at 20, 22. 
 116 Joe Andrews, 23andMe Competitor Veritas Genetics Slashes Price of Whole Genome Sequencing 
40% to $600, CNBC (July 1, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/01/for-600-veritas-
genetics-sequences-6point4-billion-letters-of-your-dna.html.  As of December 2019, Veritas has 
halted its U.S. operations due to investors’ fears of increased oversight from the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States.  While it looks for potential buyers, however, its 
international services remain open.  Christina Farr, Veritas Genetics, The Start-Up That Can 
Sequence a Human Genome for Less Than $600, Ceases US Operations and is in Talks with 
Potential Buyers, CNBC (Dec. 5, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/05/veritas-
genetics-to-cease-us-operations-talks-with-buyers.html. 
 117 Some other tests include: testing of just the X or Y chromosome, mitochondrial testing (sequencing 
of mitochondrial DNA alone, usually done to trace maternal ancestry), and whole exome sequencing 
(i.e. sequencing of only the coding portions of the genome, rather than the whole genome). 
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DNA in detail.
118
  However, these kinds of tests may soon be supplemented or 
replaced by more invasive sequencing tests.  For instance, the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services now funds research that 
specifically aims to sequence newborns’ genomes, and its long-running 
newborn genetic screening program counts among its goals, “to know all” and 
develop “long-term data collection and surveillance.”
119
 
4. Insights Gleaned from Sequenced DNA (Individual and Aggregate) 
This category of genetic information no longer involves biologic data, but 
rather inferences gleaned from that biologic data.  That is, once an individual’s 
DNA has been transferred into a computer file listing out their A’s, T’s, C’s, 
and G’s, various statistical tests are run on the sequence to produce the 
inferential results most people are most familiar with (e.g. You do not have 
the e4 variant [of the APOE gene, the most common genetic variant associated 
with late-onset Alzheimer’s disease] we tested or your genetics make you 
unlikely to detect certain bitter tastes
120
).  Most tests rely upon the fact that an 
individual’s DNA is inherited, and draw their conclusions based on similarity 
or dissimilarity to either known relatives or samples intended to represent a 
larger (or, the whole) human population.
121
 
The type of statistical methodology varies according to the genetic data at 
hand, the desired insight to be gleaned, and the level of mathematical 
complexity chosen by analysts.
122
  No regulations appear to be in place that 
mandates that particular methodologies be used or levels of statistical 
 
 118 How Many Newborns Are Screened in the United States?, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/newborn/conditioninfo/infants-
screened (last updated Sept. 1, 2017). 
 119 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HERITABLE DISORDERS IN NEWBORNS AND CHILDREN, NEWBORN 
SCREENING: TOWARDS A UNIFORM SCREENING PANEL AND SYSTEM 11 (2006), 
https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/advisory-committees/heritable-disorders/newborn-
uniform-screening-panel.pdf; see also NIH Program Explores the Use of Genomic Sequencing in 
Newborn Healthcare, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Sept 4, 2013), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-
releases/nih-program-explores-use-genomic-sequencing-newborn-healthcare (describing an initial set 
of newborn genomic sequencing studies funded by HHS). 
 120 Sample Trait Report, 23ANDME, https://permalinks.23andme.com/pdf/samplereport_traits.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2019). 
 121 See Jerome Kelleher et al., Inferring Whole-Genome Histories in Large Population Datasets, 51 
NATURE GENETICS 1330, 1333 (2019) (“DNA sequences can be considered mosaics of sequence 
fragments that have been inherited from recent ancestors through an error-prone copying process.  
Similarly, these ancestors are themselves mosaics, copied imperfectly from yet older ancestors.”) 
 122 See, e.g., Giovanni Montana, Statistical Methods in Genetics, 7 BRIEFINGS IN BIOINFORMATICS 
297, 297 (2006) (describing basic statistical tests in genetic testing); Ingrid Lobo, Genetics & Statistical 
Analysis, 1 NATURE EDUC. 109, 109 (2008) (explaining that “‘significance’ has a very particular 
meaning in biology due to statistics”). 
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significance reported prior to publication for tests not mandated by law (e.g. 
direct-to-consumer genetic tests, research studies). 
Accordingly, while some genetic variants have become widely accepted, 
genetic “insights” in this category can represent a roulette game of 
unconfirmed genetic associations and poorly translated statistical analysis.
123
   
Yet, the seemingly functional predictions in this category tend to be the most 
talked about, and are of greatest interest to those seeking to use genetic testing 
for applied purposes.  It is of vital importance that non-scientists seeking to 
use the results of genetic testing understand the limitations of the specific tests 
at issue, and more generally, to realize that there is wide diversity of applicable 
tests and potential results for any given “insight” generated. 
B. Different Bundles, Different Sticks 
Differences between the five categories of genetic information require that 
a different set and weighting of property rights attach to each.  Since individuals 
must be able to understand what data is being gathered about them and why, 
and be able to opt out of the product or service in order to feel in control of 
their data, this Section attempts to highlight “sticks” in the various bundles of 
rights that would promote those two preconditions.
124  
That said, achieving any 
kind of anonymity or opt-out is rapidly becoming impossible given the 
relational nature of genetic sequencing data.  To that end, this Article focuses 
more heavily on rights that confer use constraints like data minimization 
because they more closely track the kind of ways other privacy-based property 
interests like nuisance operate.  
 
 123 See, e.g., Robert L. Klitzman, Misunderstandings Concerning Genetics Among Patients Confronting 
Genetic Disease, 19 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 430, 430 (2010) (“Misunderstandings about statistics 
and genetics often fueled each other, and reflected denial, and desires for hope and control”); Sharon 
Begley, Consumers Aren’t Wild About Genetic Testing – Nor Are Doctors, STAT NEWS (Feb. 12, 
2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/02/12/consumers-arent-wild-genetic-testing-doctors 
(explaining that “[w]hen doctors in the Sermo survey were asked why they would not recommend 
genome sequencing, the responses ranged from ‘It is not evidence-based,’ and ‘I am not sure what 
the clinical benefit would be,’ to ‘What does one do with [information indicating] you will eventually 
have a heart attack?’” (alteration in original)); Christie Aschwanden, We’re All ‘P-Hacking’ Now, 
WIRED (Nov. 26, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/were-all-p-hacking-now (“Results 
from a study can be analyzed in a variety of ways, and p-hacking refers to a practice where researchers 
select the analysis that yields a pleasing result.  The p refers to the p-value, a ridiculously complicated 
statistical entity that’s essentially a measure of how surprising the results of a study would be if the 
effect you’re looking for wasn’t there.”). 
 124 See DANA MCKAY ET AL., STATE OF THE ART IN DATA TRACKING TECHNOLOGY 10 (2019), 
http://cprc.org.au/wp-content/uploads/State-of-the-Art-in-Data-Tracking-
Technology_UoM_FINAL_01112019.pdf) (outlining the technologies used to track consumers 
data). 
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This Article does not question the adequacy or necessity of obtaining 
informed consent before removing biological materials to be used in research. 
Evidently, though both the Food and Drug Administration and the 
Department of Health and Human Services require it,
125 
procedures for 
procuring informed consent require reform, and do not clearly apply to 
entirely private research entities that receive no government funding. But that 
is a separate nest of hornets. Nor does this Article tackle the economic tangle 
of how and when individuals might receive monetary compensation for their 
biological materials. Thus, it largely bypasses related literature on 
biotechnology patent law, organ transplant regulation,
126
 harvesting of non-
cellular, non-organ body parts such as bones,
127
 and life insurance and worker’s 
compensation.
128
 Indeed, debate in these areas and genetic research is often 




Before diving into each category in turn, a few observations.  First, 
observers should not assume that the potential for privacy invasions advances 
in the same linear fashion as the collection and data processing process.  For 
instance, while whole organs or limbs that would fall into category one seem 
intuitively seem to be most personal or proximate to an individual’s body, 
 
 125 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Botkin, Informed Consent for the Collection of Biological Samples in Household 
Surveys, in CELLS AND SURVEYS: SHOULD BIOLOGICAL MEASURES BE INCLUDED IN SOCIAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH? 276, 276 (Caleb E. Finch et al. eds., 2001) (describing how tissue repositories 
have come under considerable fire regarding the propriety of their use, given that “(1) contemporary 
genetic technology permits a detailed analysis of small tissue samples; (2) a wide variety of mutations 
. . . are associated with serious health problems; (3) there is substantial concern . . . over genetic 
discrimination in insurance and employment; and (4) many samples have been collected without 
informed consent”). 
 126 See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2018) (prohibiting the sale of human organs 
and authorizing the Department of Health and Human Services to create and regulate what has now 
become the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network); Timeline of Historical Events and 
Significant Milestones, ORGANDONOR.GOV, https://www.organdonor.gov/about/facts-
terms/history.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2021) (outlining the timeline of historical events regarding 
donating organs).  
 127 See, e.g., Melody Petersen, In the Rush to Harvest Body Parts, Death Investigations Have Been 
Upended, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-10-
13/body-parts-harvesting-hinders-coroner-autopsies (discussing the harvesting of body parts from 
people in Los Angeles County). 
 128 See, e.g., Lena Groeger, Michael Grabell & Cynthia Cotts, Workers’ Comp Benefits: How Much is 
a Limb Worth?, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 5, 2015), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/workers-
compensation-benefits-by-limb (showing the results of calculations of limb worth for workers’ 
compensation purposes). 
 129 See, e.g., Greenberg v. Mia. Child.’s Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1066 (S.D. Fla. 
2003) (granting defendant researcher, hospital, and research institute’s motion to dismiss in part in a 
case involving, among others, claims of breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and patent rights). 
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without further processing, this category yields the least genetic information.  
However, all downstream genetic information first requires source biological 
material.  Therein lies one of the dilemmas of genetic information, and of big 
data projects in general: objects from upstream categories can enable 
collection of information from most or all of the categories that follow.  Thus, 
property rights in upstream categories of objects must be mindful of inevitable 
function creep, and of the fact that laboratory processing is rapidly becoming 
faster, cheaper, and more accessible to the lay public.  Finally, the private 
nature of many genetic research and production partnerships and the 
difficulties of pricing what a person’s data is worth
130
 make it unclear what 
categories are truly of greatest value to researchers and industry.  This Article 
assumes that the raw sequencing data in category three and the purified DNA 
from category two are of most utility, given that it is of greatest research 
flexibility and takes perhaps the most physical effort to create, respectively.  
Those categories, however, likely do not align with the categories of greatest 
value to the average American.  This Article assumes that those categories will 
instead be categories one (for reasons abovementioned) and four (the “end 
product” insights that are the most digestible to consumers without training in 
genetics or bioinformatics).  Accordingly, the particular focuses of property 
rights in categories two and three should weight towards consumer privacy 
protections, while those in the other categories should prioritize traditional 
property-privacy rights that bolster personal autonomy and independence. 
Turning to category one (source biological materials), as others have noted, 
there undoubtedly is something inherently sacrosanct about human bodily 




Accordingly, people are able to treat their 
bodies as objects of property in some ways (e.g. bequeathing it for research 
purposes or donating organs to specific family members) but not others (e.g. 
selling one’s self into servitude).  As Justice Mosk noted in his Moore dissent, 
“Since property or title is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and 
immunities, the pruning away of some or a great many of these elements does 
not entirely destroy the title[.]” . . . [Thus] even if we assume that [California 
law] limited the use and disposition of his excised tissue . . . [Moore] at least 
 
 130 See Marie C. Baca, What You Do on the Internet is Worth a Lot. Exactly How Much, Nobody 
Knows, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/14/what-you-do-internet-is-worth-lot-exactly-
how-much-nobody-knows (describing the challenges faced by academics, policymakers, and 
consumers in arriving at an accurate estimate of how much one’s internet presence is worth). 
 131 See, e.g., Danforth, supra note 90, at 191 (1988) (quoting ethicist Thomas Murray’s analysis of Moore 
v. Regents of California, wherein Murray noted that even after removal, humans appear to retain 
moral interests in human organs and tissues “so that at least they are not misused or treated in an 
undignified manner”). 
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had the right to do with his own tissue whatever the defendants did with it: i.e. 
he could have contracted with researchers and pharmaceutical companies to 
develop and exploit the vast commercial potential of his tissue and its 
products.
132 
Combining Mosk’s apt observation that human tissues are regularly subject 
to contractual relations with a strong desire to preserve human dignity, 
category one might best be described as carrying with it: (1) rights of exclusive 
possession and personal use whilst living
133
 (2) at least a partial right to manage 
use by others; and (3) a right to confidentiality. Indeed, a number of major 
industry players in this space recognize these limited property rights already.  
23andMe customers, for example, may choose to let the company store their 
saliva samples and by doing so, explicitly grant consent for it to access and 
analyze that stored sample for between one and ten years.
134
  And, prominently 
placed on its Privacy Center homepage, the company states, “you . . . decide 
how your information is used and with whom it is shared.”
135  
Likewise, 
Ancestry, another genetic testing giant, stores customers’ saliva and DNA after 
initial processing, but allows requests for destruction of biological materials at 
any time because “[y]ou always maintain ownership of your DNA and DNA 
Data[.]”
136  
In this way, major genetic testing players seem to be coalescing 
around a norm of limited personal control over biological samples and 
contractual agreement regarding their use, both of which give rise to property-
like or property rights.  All of the same arguments likewise apply to extracted 
DNA in category two, to the extent that companies imply that the physical 
DNA extracted from saliva samples is functionally the same as the saliva itself 
for their purposes.  And at least one state, Alaska, has passed legislation stating, 
“a DNA sample [is] . . . the exclusive property of the person sampled or 
analyzed” and awarding individuals both a private cause of action and the 
prospect of pressing criminal misdemeanor charges against alleged 
wrongdoers.
137 
Courts assigning a limited property right to this category of 
 
 132 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 510 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting 
People v. Walker, 33 Cal. App. 2d 18, 20 (1939)) (emphasis in original). 
 133 Id.; see also Hecht v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that a sperm donor may have a property-like interest in his stored semen “to the extent that he had 
decisionmaking authority as to the sperm within the scope of policy set by law.”). 
 134 See Biobanking Consent Document, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/biobanking (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2019) (spelling out the terms to which 23AndMe users consent). 
 135 Privacy Center, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/privacy/?vip=true (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).  
While saliva samples cannot be returned to consumers because 23andMe processes them in an 
irreversible manner, presumably this assurance extends to unprocessed and leftover saliva samples. 
 136 Privacy Statement, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement (last visited Nov. 
18, 2019). 
 137 ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2019). 
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genetic information, then, would merely be recognizing extant industry 
practices and shifts in state laws. 
These rights are even stronger in the context of sequenced DNA (category 
three) due to the intimate details that data may reveal about an individual and 
its increased commercial and research value. First, it is here that many 
companies’ privacy statements, new privacy laws, and consumer protection 
groups are focused, as can be evidenced by their definitions of genetic 
information. For instance, Nevada law defines it as “any information that is 
obtained from a genetic test.”
138
  Alaska’s genetic privacy law refers to the 
“DNA sample and the results of a DNA analysis.”
139
  Neither definition has 
clear contours yet, but at minimum would seem to cover the sequencing data 
that is the initial output of a genetic test. 
Private actors, however, seem to use definitions of genetic information that 
would include category three but also overlap two or more other categories.  
23andMe’s most recent Privacy Statement, for example, defines Personal 
Information to include both “information regarding your 
genotypes . . . generated through processing of your saliva by 23andMe or by 
its contractors, successors, or assignees; or otherwise processed by and/or 
contributed to 23andMe” and information about site usage and other 
behaviors used  
[t]o analyze and improve our Services[,] . . .  [t]o process, analyze and deliver 
your genetic testing results[,] . . . [t]o allow you to share your Personal 
Information with others[,] . . . [t]o allow you to share your Personal 
Information for 23andMe Research purposes[,] . . . [t]o recruit you for 
external research[,] . . . [t]o provide customer support[,] . . . [t]o conduct 




Ancestry, only somewhat more clearly, separates what it analyses into saliva, 
DNA and DNA Data.  The latter, however, includes both a customer’s 
individual data file as well as family tree data and “derivative Genetic 





overlap can lead to complicated contractual rights, courts should recognize 
that most genetic testing companies appear to refer to genetic information as 
 
 138 NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.111 (2019). 
 139 ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2020). 
 140 See Privacy Policy, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy (last updated Oct. 30, 2020) 
[hereinafter 23andMe Privacy Policy] (noting that the definition of “genetic information” includes 
“[i]nformation . . . as outlined in Section 3,” which includes the additional data here mentioned). 
 141 Privacy Statement, supra note 136. 
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at least including an individual’s sequenced DNA data or similar marker 
presence reports. 
Second, companies use the genetic information in this category as a 
valuable, fungible commodity that, while it may not be bought and sold, is 
regularly traded for other things of value via commercial arrangements.  As of 
2015, 23andMe has signed a total of fourteen partnerships
142
 with private 
companies and universities, all of which trade access to its database of genetic 
data in return for both specified (a $300 million stake in its company from 
pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline in 2018 in return for access;
143
 $10 
million upfront and $50 million pending milestones reached by Genentech in 
return for access
144
) and unspecified (pharmaceutical company Pfizer has kept 
its deal terms secret
145
) consideration.  In fact, because many large genetic data 
sets are privately owned and increasingly used by even academic researchers 
in order to publish major research papers,
146
 such exchanges of database access 
for either commercially valuable company or product stakes or prestige-
granting credit in resulting publications may become even more commonplace 
with time. 
Taken together, it is little wonder that category three is the focus of most 
“rights talk” in this emerging area of privacy and property law.  23andMe, for 
example, with respect to genetic information, offers customers a: “[r]ight to 
withdraw consent . . . at any time,” “[r]ight of access to and rectification of your 
Personal Information,” “[r]ight to be [f]orgotten,” “[r]ight to data portability,” 
“[r]ight to restriction of our processing,” “[n]otification of erasure, rectification 
 
 142 See Mark Sullivan, 23andMe Has Signed 12 Other Genetic Data Partnerships Beyond Pfizer and 
Genentech, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 14, 2015, 7:00 PM), 
https://venturebeat.com/2015/01/14/23andme-has-signed-12-other-genetic-data-partnerships-
beyond-pfizer-and-genentech (“Wojcicki said her company has actually signed a total of 14 
partnerships with private companies and universities”). 
 143 See Sarah Zhang, Big Pharma Would Like Your DNA, ATLANTIC (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/big-pharma-dna/566240 (discussing these 
access transactions). 
 144 See Nick Paul Taylor, 23andMe Strikes $60M Genentech Deal to Continue Pivot to Database-
Driven R&D, FIERCE BIOTECH (Jan. 12, 2015, 7:50 AM), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/r-
d/23andme-strikes-60m-genentech-deal-to-continue-pivot-to-database-driven-r-d (highlighting the 
Genentech deal). 
 145 See James Vincent, 23andMe to Offer Users’ Medical Data to Pfizer for Research, VERGE (Jan. 13, 
2015, 7:52 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/1/13/7536635/23andme-pfizer-deal-sharing-
genetic-data (“[T]he value of this latest deal with Pfizer has not been disclosed . . . .”). 
 146 See Kayte Spector-Bagdady, Amanda Fakih, Chris Krenz, Erica E. Marsh & J. Scott Roberts, Genetic 
Data Partnerships: Academic Publications With Privately Owned or Generated Genetic Data, 21 
GENETICS MEDICINE 2827 (2019) (finding that the number of publications using private genetic data 
sets has increased from four in 2011 to fifty-seven in 2017, and the type of contributor consent is 
unclear or undisclosed in the resulting scientific publication 43% of the time). 
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and restriction,” “[r]ight to object to processing,” and the “right to not be 
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing.”
147
  But, as appears 
to be an industry standard, customers “should not expect any financial benefit” 
from their tests’ processing and “acquire no rights in any research or 
commercial products that may be developed.”
148  
23andMe also retains a 
customer ’s Personal Information until he deletes his account.  And, no 
guidance explains whether accounts delete automatically upon a customer’s 
death, or whether 23andMe instead gains perpetual access to a deceased 
customer’s genetic information.
149
  Ancestry, on the other hand, gives 
consumers explicit ownership rights in their DNA sample and data file, but 
retains use rights.
150
   
Thus, individuals appear to have strong control rights over this category of 
genetic information as it relates to personal privacy, even as they 
simultaneously lose the right to monitor onward transfer of their information 
and the right to profit from it.  This is not unlike how established property 
interests such as affirmative easements may ensure a right of way remains 
across one’s land even after the owner of the burdened land has transferred 
the land to another.  This may make sense, however, given the familial nature 
of DNA.  Genetic relatedness is predictable: an individual’s DNA is unique 
overall, but large sections of their genetic code are shared.   In this way, just 
one family member sharing their genetic information exposes the information 
of all their known and unknown relatives and ancestors, as well as future 
descendants.
151
  At this stage, then, it maybe makes less sense to speak of 
 
 147 23andMe Privacy Policy, supra note 140.  That this language seems to directly echo the human rights 
prescribed by the General Data Protection Regulation that went into effect in 2018 is likely no 
coincidence.  But to what extent the European Union’s view of privacy will proliferate in practice, 
particularly in 23andMe’s transactions with American consumers, is yet unclear. 
 148 Terms of Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/tos (last updated Sept. 30, 2019). 
 149 See id. (eschewing any discussion of automatic account deletion). 
 150 See Terms and Conditions (US), ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/health-terms (last 
accessed Nov. 19, 2019) (“You always maintain ownership of your data, but we need the ability to 
use your data for the purposes set out in our Privacy Statement and these Terms, and, if you agree 
to it, in our Informed Consent to Research. . . . Also, by submitting User Provided Content through 
any of the Services, you grant Ancestry a sublicensable, worldwide, royalty-free license to host, store, 
copy, publish, distribute, provide access to, create derivative works of, and otherwise use such User 
Provided Content . . . . This includes the right for Ancestry to copy, display, and index your User 
Provided Content.  Ancestry will own the indexes it creates.  We will also have the right to continue 
to use your User Provided Content, even if you stop using the Services, but only as necessary for us 
to provide and improve the Services.”) (effective Oct. 15, 2019). 
 151 See, e.g., Drake Bennett & Kristen V. Brown, Your DNA Is Out There.  Do You Want Law 
Enforcement Using It?, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 27, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-27/your-dna-is-out-there-do-you-want-law-
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commercial ownership rights or strong onward use limitations due to the 
impracticability of accounting for relatives. 
In a similar vein, the information in category four seems to signal a place 
in the processing chain at which the object at issue ceases to be viewed as 
physical biological material that came from a unique individual and begins to 
take on a more abstract, medical data-like quality.  Notably, once DNA is 
sequenced as part of a genetic test, it becomes a “lab result” that the federal 
regulations associated with the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act provide a right to directly access.
152
  This shift thus ensures 
some kind of a right to supervise, or at least remain informed, of what one ’s 
DNA sequence contains at any time in addition to the usual panoply of rights 
afforded to medical information.  That said, these kinds of rights might only 
apply so long as the insights gleaned from the DNA are targeted towards a 
particular individual. 
Category five information, on the other hand, offers inferential insights and 
research conclusions at a population-wide level that may at first appear 
sufficiently de-anonymized to merit the evaporation of user controls over 
information at this stage.  But, while customers are explicitly told their data 
cannot be deleted from studies it has already been incorporated into, or that 
they have no rights or expected profits in any products or services developed 
from their information, there is a growing body of evidence that shows such 
anonymity is a fiction.
153
  In that case, it would make sense to give category five 
information the same consumer protection and medical privacy rights that 
accompany categories three and four, depending on the type of conclusion 
being drawn from the information at hand.  Because property rights are 
flexible, specific carve-outs could also be made exempting intellectual property 
rights. 
 
enforcement-using-it (discussing how an individual’s DNA is easily identifiable and could be used by 
law enforcement). 
 152 See Jessica L. Roberts, Genetic Conversion 9 (Mar. 15, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3357566) (discussing how DNA is regulated in regard to HIPAA). 
 153 See Brown, supra note 5 (explaining that, whether or not genetic information is deliberately made 
public, “anyone can be exposed”). See generally Mathias Humbert, Kévin Huguenin, Joachim 
Hugonot, Erman Ayday & Jean-Pierre Hubaux, De-anonymizing Genomic Databases Using 
Phenotypic Traits, 2 PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 99 (2015) (discussing how anonymity of 
genetic material is a fiction even if identifying information is removed). 
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III. FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF RECOGNIZING GENETIC 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Strong privacy interests in genetic information give rise to norms of limited 
property rights across a number of sources of authority that the common law 
looks to.
154
  Recognition of those property rights has consequences—including, 
for example, far more robust Fourth Amendment protections. 
The Fourth Amendment, above all, recognizes and respects individuals’ 
property rights because of their fundamental privacy interests in their bodies 
and personal spaces.  The Amendment protects the “right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”
155
  Per the Amendment, a police search of items within 
the four enumerated categories is presumptively unreasonable absent a 




Part of the reason why genetic information seems unlikely to receive 
Fourth Amendment protection under current law is because it is hard to tell 
which enumerated category it fits into.  A person’s liver, removed for purposes 
of genetic testing, would seem to implicate a search of his “person.”  The same, 
however, may not be true of his fully sequenced DNA.  That DNA encodes 
his liver (indeed, is the reason his liver exists!) and may allow highly sensitive 
inferences about his medical condition or lifestyle, but, having been 
transformed from biological material into a computer file composed of four 
letters, may be a digital “paper” or even an “effect.”
157
  The genetic information 
taxonomy set out in Part II aims to help courts parse this question with greater 
nuance, and to encourage law enforcement agents to request clearer, more 
responsible warrants that specify what category of genetic “thing” is to be 
collected or surveilled.  But even so, it is impossible to escape the fact even 
highly processed, digitized genetic information invariably describes unique 
individuals in great personal detail. 
 
 154 That is, sources such as state law, shifts in social customs and public opinion, and common industry 
practices. 
 155 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
156      Id.  
 157 See generally Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal 
Property Due Protection, 125 YALE L. J. 946 (2016) (investigating the absence of a coherent doctrinal 
approach for finding Fourth Amendment “effects” and issues arising from the Supreme Court’s 
recent reintroduction of the term without defining it). 
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Section II.A argues that, while courts may be undecided about which 
Fourth Amendment protected category to place genetic information under,
158
 
many of the same property rights and privacy interests at the heart of the 
trespass branch of search doctrine are implicated in searches of most, if not 
all, forms of genetic information.  Accordingly, genetic information is 
deserving of far more robust Fourth Amendment protections than it currently 
receives.
159
  Section II.B then revisits Part II’s five categories of genetic 
information and estimates, based on the privacy interests at stake for each, the 
strength of corresponding Fourth Amendment protections that should 
accompany them. 
A. Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests and Property 
Though the Court in Carpenter v. United States (2018) sought in part to 
reconcile Fourth Amendment search doctrine with modern surveillance 
technology capabilities,
160
 its holding neither resolved existing doctrinal 
confusions nor set out a new, superseding test for determining a police search.  
Thus, there now appear to be three tests in play when looking to decide 
whether law enforcement has violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights: (1) the common law trespass test revived in 2005 by Jones that had 
previously dominated until 1967;
161
 (2) the Katz reasonable expectation of 
 
 158 Though the Court in Florida v. Jardines suggested that the trespass-based analysis applies only when 
the trespass occurs in one of the four places or things listed in the Fourth Amendment (thereby 
exempting “open fields”), it has also said that historical understandings of the Fourth Amendment 
are key to securing “the privacies of life” against “arbitrary power.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 
(2013); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018). 
 159 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 461–62 (2013) (upholding a warrantless collection of DNA 
samples from arrestees because collecting a cheek swab was minimally invasive and arrestees have a 
diminished expectation of privacy).  Importantly, this case focused solely on the use of DNA for 
identification (for information on how flawed a process that is, see ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE 
CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA (2015)) and held that the search at issue was the initial 
collection of DNA from the cheek via swab collection, rather than further analysis of that DNA. See 
id. 
 160 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–23 (discussing how modern formats for surveillance do not negate 
Fourth Amendment protections). 
 161 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (noting that despite the dominance of Katz’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Fourth Amendment at minimum grants individuals the 
protections afforded at its adoption, therefore deeming instances of common law trespass by the 
police without a warrant to constitute an unreasonable search). 
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privacy test set out in 1967;
162
 and (3) the new multi-factor “test” set out in 
Carpenter.163 
Each of the three tests has clear limitations.  The first, as Katz, noted, risks 
eroding Fourth Amendment privacy protections because surveillance 
technologies no longer need to physically trespass in order to conduct highly 
invasive surveillance.
164
  The Katz test, however, has been noted by many to be 
a circular test that does not present a clear set of criteria by which courts can 
determine which expectations of privacy are “reasonable.”
165
  And while 
Carpenter’s impact in lower courts is only beginning to be felt, courts and 
commentators have varied in their weighting and definition of the various 
factors the Carpenter Court alluded to.166  Of the three tests, when satisfied, 
trespass confers by far the most robust Fourth Amendment protections 
because it sets out a bright-line rule.  If the police commit a physical trespass 
into one of the four constitutionally protected categories (persons, houses, 
papers, and effects) without a warrant, they commit an unreasonable search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Though the Court has struggled to connect different strands of search 
doctrine, property law-based understandings remain the tests’ common 
denominator.  In an early, and perhaps the Court’s only, attempt to resolve 
the circularity of the Katz test, the Court stated in a footnote in the 1978 case 
Rakas v. Illinois that “expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside 
of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal 
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by 
society.”
167
  We thus have two cross-test guideposts for examining whether and 
 
 162 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (replacing the trespassory search test because the 
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places” and holding that it is unconstitutional for police to 
search any area without a warrant wherein a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 163 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (referring to the Majority’s approach as a 
“multifactor analysis––considering intimacy, comprehensiveness, expense, retrospectivity, and 
voluntariness”).  See also Ohm, supra note 16 (discussing the new reasonable expectation of privacy 
test under Carpenter). 
 164 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53 (discussing the loss of privacy that can occur because physical trespass 
is no longer necessary in all circumstances). 
 165 See e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 S. 
CT. REV. 173, 188 (1979) (“[I]t is circular to say that there is no invasion of privacy unless the 
individual whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable expectation of privacy; whether he will or will 
not have such an expectation will depend on what the legal rule is”). 
 166 See e.g., Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect 
Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 219 (2018) (distilling four factors from the Court’s holding for 
determining when search violates the Fourth Amendment: “whether the technique was (1) hidden, 
(2) continuous, (3) indiscriminate, and (4) intrusive”). 
 167 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
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to what extent new technologies enable the government to infringe on 
individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights: property law and social views on 
privacy, as usually evidenced by statute and common practice.
168
 
Understanding the Court’s reference to property law concepts requires 
delving into the trespass-oriented “historical understandings ‘of what was 
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] 
was adopted.’”
169
  From that, it becomes clear that the property law rights 
protected at the founding via trespass are indivisible from personal privacy 
interests such as those at stake in genetic information. 
The seminal cases expounding these understandings are Boyd v. United 
States (1886),170 and the English case it cites heavily, Entick v. Carrington 
(1765).
171
  In Boyd, over the defendant’s objection, the government used a 
subpoena to indirectly seize the defendants’ books, papers, and records as part 
of a customs and revenue case.
172
  The Court held that such action constituted 
an unconstitutional search and seizure, because they were his “private” things 
and therefore “dearest property.”
173
  It did not matter to the Court whether the 
contents of the papers contained information of a secret nature or whether the 
items had been hidden upon the defendant’s property —the mere fact that the 
papers belonged to him made their seizure an unconstitutional trespass.
174
  
Instead, any secret nature of those goods served further as “an aggravation of 
the trespass” that “demand[ed] more considerable damages.”
175
  Though the 
case’s holding has since been narrowed, its reasoning remains important for 
its sweeping discussion of the Fourth Amendment’s origins and ambitions. 
Boyd’s reasoning drew upon the memory of British soldiers’ harassment 
of colonists via general writs of assistance and of related court proceedings 
both at home and in England.
 176
  To that end, the Court quoted both James 
 
 168 Notably, the same logic runs throughout constitutional procedural due process cases defining the 
scope of protected property rights.  See e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
577 (1972) (“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.  Rather, they are 
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law . . . .”). 
 169 United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214–15 (2018) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 149 (1925)). 
 170 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 171 Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029. 
 172 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617–18. 
 173 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623, 627–28. 
 174 Id. at 627–28.  See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1914) (reiterating the 
underlying principle from Boyd). 
 175 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627–28. 
 176 See id. at 623, 625–26 (discussing the practice of issuing general warrants permitting the search of 
private houses). 
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Otis and John Adams to the effect that arbitrary searches of private places by 
police were among “the most destructive [instruments] of English liberty.”
177
  
The Boyd Court also quoted extensively from Entick v. Carrington, an English 
case that would have been forefront in the Founders’ minds whilst drafting the 
Fourth Amendment.
178
  Entick was an action for trespass against royal officers 
who had broken into the plaintiff’s “dwelling-house” to search for and read his 
papers.
179
  On the whole, Entick emphatically and repeatedly made note of the 
rights attached to property ownership.  Indeed, in ruling for the plaintiff, Lord 
Camden stated, “The great end, for which men entered into society was to 
secure their property,” and trespassers that threated that security and 
corresponding right to exclude were subject to strict liability.
180
 
Boyd was intended from the first to address “the very essence of 
constitutional liberty and security” protected by the Fourth Amendment and 
“reach farther than the concrete form of the case . . . to all invasions on the 
part of the government and its employés of the sanctity of a man’s home and 
the privacies of life.”
181
  Its language explicitly linked “personal liberty and 
private property,” and makes clear that the trespass test of search doctrine 
protected both.
 182
  According to the Court, trespass was an appropriate vehicle 
for protection because the “essence of the offence” by police was “not the 
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers” but rather the 
invasion of the “sacred right” of property ownership and, presumably, the 




Other Fourth Amendment cases prior to Katz are likewise replete with 
language cementing a deep connection between property rights in trespass and 
the protection of personal privacy interests.  In fact, the Court has stated the 
proposition outright, as in Adams v. New York where it held that “[t]he 
security intended to be guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment against 
wrongful search and seizures is designed to prevent violations of private 
security in person and property . . . .”184  The house and home, for instance, 
are almost always mentioned in the same breath as the privacy and security 
 
 177 Id. at 625. 
 178 See id. at 625–29. 
 179 Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1030. 
 180 Id. at 1066.  
 181 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
 182 See id.  
 183 See id. 
 184 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904) (emphasis added). 
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expected by individuals within it.
185
  Indeed, even after the Court adopted the 
Katz test, it consistently held that courts should “afford[] heightened protection 
to a person’s right to be left alone in the privacy of his house.”
186 
The Court ’s repeated and emphatic framing of the pertinent privacy 
interest as a right to be let alone is not insignificant.
187
  Arguably, it is this 
framing that first enabled the Court in Katz to discard the trespass test and 
recognize that privacy rights at times extend beyond the edges of physical 
property.  And, that framing has roots older than even its celebrated debut in 
Warren and Brandeis’ famous 1890 article.
188
  Indeed, even in Entick, Lord 
Camden had noted that an “owner ’s goods and chattels . . . are so far from 
enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection” even though at 
that time “the eye cannot by the laws . . . be guilty of a trespass.”
189
  This 
suggests that the property rights at issue in Fourth Amendment cases brush up 
against some form of a right to confidentiality, and that secrecy is necessary to 
limit access to the self so that individuals can determine what they present of 
themselves to others.
190
  Thus, by the time twentieth-century members of the 
Court had begun to expand Fourth Amendment protections to new forms of 
information and police surveillance, their arguments represented only the 
most modern iterations of well-established understandings of privacy interests 
protected by property law.
191
  In sum, the “Court has recognized Fourth 
 
 185 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914) (“[M]uch less was it within the authority of the 
United States Marshal to thus [without a warrant] invade the house and privacy of the accused.”) 
(emphasis added).  See also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“The Fourth 
Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the 
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.”). 
 186 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 187 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2002) (pointing out 
that although privacy is a sweeping concept, it can be more productively discussed in terms of its six 
main elements: “(1) the right to be let alone; (2) limited access to the self; (3) secrecy; (4) control of 
personal information; (5) personhood; and (6) intimacy”). 
 188 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) 
(arguing that “the term ‘property’ has grown to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well 
as tangible”). 
 189 Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066. 
 190 See e.g., Privacy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/privacy/ (last 
updated Jan. 18, 2018) (summarizing the history of privacy from Aristotle to present). 
 191 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers of 
our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans . . . .  They conferred, as against the Government, 
the right to be let alone . . . .”).  See also Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323–
24 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The personal effects and possessions of the individual (all 
contraband and the like excepted) are sacrosanct from prying eyes, from the long arm of the law, 
from any rummaging by police.  Privacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal 
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Amendment privacy interests that are best described as arising from the rights 
of individuals to exclude others . . . .”
192
 
As distilled from the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases, the core sticks in 
the bundle of property rights that the Fourth Amendment recognizes are the 
following: a right to exclude others from the property; a right to security upon 
that property; and most importantly, a sacrosanct privacy right usually framed 
as a right be let alone that, under certain circumstances, extend beyond the 
physical boundaries of tangible property. 
B. Protecting Genetic Information 
Under either or both of the guideposts set out in Rakas (i.e. property law 
and social views of privacy), genetic information is deserving of far more robust 
Fourth Amendment protections than it currently receives.  In this Section, I 
retrace the five categories of genetic information set out in Part II and argue 
that the categories of different bundles of property rights sticks suggest 
corresponding variation in the robustness of the Fourth Amendment 
protections that attach.  To reiterate, those five categories are as follows: (1) 
source biological materials, including saliva, blood, and whole tissues; (2) 
extracted and purified DNA; (3) sequenced DNA, in whole or in part; and 
information gleaned from sequenced DNA at both an (4) individual level and 
(5) at aggregate, i.e. population-wide.  Setting aside, for purposes of this Article, 
the problem of abandoned DNA,
193
  I assume that the biological materials at 
issue are those either still on or in a person, or removed with the intention of 
obtaining a genetic test for personal use. 
The raw biological materials that constitute category one should receive 
some of the strongest Fourth Amendment protections possible given their 
closeness to the enumerated Fourth Amendment categories of “persons,” 
 
what he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses. . . . [P]rivacy means that the individual should 
have the freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances when he will share his secrets with 
others and decide the extent of that sharing.”) 
 192 See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2012) (investigating the 
absence of a coherent doctrinal approach for finding Fourth Amendment “effects”). 
 193 Under extant case law, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to DNA taken from “abandoned” 
objects that are “knowingly exposed” to the public, such as saliva lifted from a coffee cup taken from 
garbage on the curbside.  See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Essay, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA:  The 
Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV, 857, 865 (2006).  But, genetic 
information and other microscopic biomaterials are arguably not “knowingly exposed” in the way 
that the Court envisioned larger, tangible objects to be.  And, with advances in biotechnology, 
abandonment doctrine butts heads directly with existing constitutional privacy protections.  The 
doctrine requires significant reworking as applied to biomaterials from which information beyond 
identification is extracted, though that is a project for another paper. 
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“houses,” and “effects,” and their treatment in industry contracts.  Textualist 
studies of the Fourth Amendment have argued that “persons” constituted an 
“important, but discrete” constitutionally protected area that is implicated 
whenever “police look inside a body cavity, take blood or fingerprints, scrape 
a cheek for a DNA sample, or administer a breathalyzer test.”
194
  Materials in 
category one would thus obviously fall within this constitutionally protected 
category.  Moreover, Fourth Amendment protections for “houses” appear to 
follow directly from the Founders’ views of sanctity of the person: such spaces 
are broadly agreed upon by judges and scholars to “extend[] to ‘a whole host 
of home-like settings.’”
195
  Indeed, the house and home are given heightened 
Fourth Amendment protection because they enable privacy, security, a space 
for personal development, and peace of mind.  But what good is such an 
assurance if one cannot be at home within one’s own bodily person?  The 
regular use of contracts suggesting a right of exclusive possession and personal 
use whilst living and confidentiality rights over these materials would thus 
correspond to the Fourth Amendment’s right to exclude others from one’s 
property.  And, if source biological materials are not part of “persons” or 
“houses,” then they may, once removed from the body, be an “effect” because 
“‘[e]ffects’ was used in the Framing era as a catchall term that included all 
tangible objects a person might possess, but not real property (land) and 
structures (buildings).”
196
  At this stage the materials are still very much tangible, 
and can be handled and seen by the naked eye. 
In this sense, genetic information may cause the Fourth Amendment’s 
enumerated categories to basically collapse on each other, but the difficulty of 
distinguishing them should be cause for a return to the Amendment’s first 
principles and liberal grant of protection from intrusive government action.  
Just as expectations of domestic solicitude and private ownership have 
founded the rights underlying longstanding property interests like nuisance 
and trespass, so too should individuals be able to take refuge from government 
intrusion within the homes of their own bodies. 
Genetic information from category two and onwards, however, becomes 
increasingly intangible and thus more difficult for non-scientists to 
conceptually link back to the strong privacy rights and sense of personhood 
that attach to source biological materials.  Here, should courts recognize the 
scientific truth that extracted DNA is both tangible (albeit microscopic), and 
an integral structure to human existence that is unique to its owner, all the 
 
 194 See Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. REV. 233, 260 (2019). 
 195 Id. at 262. 
 196 Id. 
May 2021] 'PERSONAL' PROPERTY 589 
same Fourth Amendment protections that would flow to category one 
materials would also apply to category two extracted DNA.  Should courts be 
wary of slipping into the same nitpicky, scientific discussions that governed 
early claims of intangible trespass, they can instead draw upon tried and tested 
sources of common law: state law and industry practice.  As mentioned in Part 
II, at least one state has passed legislation stating that DNA samples are “the 
exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed,”
197
 and genetic testing 
companies have implied that physical DNA extracted from saliva samples is 
functionally the same as the saliva itself (and, presumably, any other source 
tissues from which DNA is obtained) for their purposes. 
Because state laws and industry practice amongst genetic testing companies 
are so much stronger in the context of category three sequenced DNA, Fourth 
Amendment protections for category three genetic information would be 
stronger than for category two and closer, if not equivalent, to protections for 
category one.  After all, because sequenced DNA represents the first stage 
where biological materials are translated into written code showing how an 
individual is unique at a genetic and statistical level, the Fourth Amendment 
right to security and privacy is likely close to its zenith here.  The familial 
nature of DNA may mean that the Fourth Amendment right to exclude is 
limited to only the sections of DNA known at the time to contribute to 
individual uniqueness.  However, even then, a right to exclude should certainly 
exclude the government from improper access to this form of genetic 
information.  In instances where individuals truly do willingly relinquish their 
(usually category three) genetic information to companies whose terms of 
service do not promise privacy or even go so far as to consent in advance to 
law enforcement use, such as GEDmatch, FamilyTreeDNA, and DNASolves, 
here the right to exclude would require the government to limit their use to 
only the consenting individual.  Otherwise, to allow an individual to essentially 
consent to a search of genetic data of all her biological relatives would stretch 
beyond any form of search consent that now exists.  Even related co-tenants, 
after all, may not give consent for the police to search the other’s private room 
over the other person’s objection or clear indicia of expected privacy such as 
a locked door.  While that may cause specific “crime-solving” companies like 
DNASolves to shutter, that may not be a bad thing.  Policing is a public duty—
not a private one—and if the police cannot lawfully obtain evidence sufficient 
for a warrant of a suspect’s involvement beyond some genetic similarity to a 
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distant relative, then perhaps such identifying information is rightly beyond the 
government’s reach. 
Category four genetic information (i.e. information gleaned from 
sequenced DNA at an individual level) presents the greatest analytical 
problems because of the “nettlesome question [of] when an ownable datum 
of IHI is created.”
198
  Again, however, the core inquiry in the context of police 
searches and seizures should not hinge upon individuals’ rights relative to 
other private individuals.  Here, the question is purely whether such private 
spaces—which would here almost always in the context of scientific research 
testing, medical genetic testing, or personal genetic testing, include insights into 
constitutionally protected personal characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and 
private medical history—may be subject to government intrusion.  The answer 
must be a resounding “no” if the Fourth Amendment is to have meaning in 
the face of advances in genetic technology.  In fact, both Justice Brandeis, 
dissenting in Olmstead (1928),199 and Justice Gorsuch, “dissenting” a century 
later in Carpenter (2018)200 have stated as much.  Popular opinion provides 
further support: likely in reaction to the passage of data privacy laws such as 
GDPR and growing concerns over the wildfire-like spread of genetic genealogy 
techniques, genetic testing companies such as 23andMe have seen a decrease 
in test sales over the course of 2019 and increasingly sought through their 
privacy policy updates to assure consumers that their personal testing reports 
remain confidential, and that companies will not cooperate with police 




 198 Jorge L. Contreras, The False Promise of Health Data Ownership, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 637 
(2019).  Contreras rightly points out that 
[c]onscious awareness of property is generally not required for it to exist. . . . If the basis for 
treating IHI as property derives from one’s inherent right to own all information about 
oneself, then it seems that unfixed, unknown information should, indeed, be considered 
property.  Yet the practical difficulties associated with this extreme version of ownership are 
significant. 
  Note that in this Article, "IHI stands for individual health information.”  Id. at 625. 
 199 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (warning that 
“[a]dvances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, 
thoughts and emotions” of which government surveillance would avail itself). 
 200 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Can [the 
government] secure your DNA from 23andMe without a warrant or probable cause?  Smith and 
Miller say yes it can—at least without running afoul of Katz.  But that result strikes most lawyers and 
judges today—me included—as pretty unlikely.  In the years since its adoption, countless scholars, too, 
have come to conclude that the ‘third-party doctrine is not only wrong, but horribly wrong.’”). 
 201 See, e.g., Christina Farr, 23andMe Lays Off 100 People as DNA Test Sales Decline, CEO Says She 
Was ‘Surprised’ to See Market Turn, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2020, 1:15 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/23/23andme-lays-off-100-people-ceo-anne-wojcicki-explains-
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On the other hand, category five presents the weakest case for property 
ownership and Fourth Amendment protection because it has been pooled and 
serves a population-wide purpose.  I assume here that individuals’ data can be 
easily de-anonymized, but that they have consented to participation in pooled 
research upon their personal data from categories three and four.  
Nevertheless, once inferences from genetic information are directed towards 
population-wide inquiries rather than personal ones, because most companies 
and researchers explicitly tell individuals that their data cannot be deleted from 
studies it has already been incorporated into, and that they have no rights or 
expected profits  in commercial items developed from such pooled 
information, it is likely that category five information would receive weak or 
no Fourth Amendment rights of exclusion and security while retaining a 
limited right to privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the duty of common law courts to update legal doctrine as society 
evolves, and “to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and 
against any stealthy encroachments thereon,”
202
 courts should recognize that all 
forms of genetic information (albeit to varying degrees) likely carry with them 
a limited property right intended to protect privacy interests.  After all, since 
time immemorial, robust property rights such those of trespass and nuisance 
have demonstrated the dynamic nature of the common law and the privacy 
interests they protect. 
Upon recognizing a limited property right in genetic information, courts 
are then bound also to recognize that far more vigorous Fourth Amendment 
protections follow.  Rooted in both social views of privacy and industry 
practices respecting them, property rights in genetic information implicate all 
the core guarantees of liberty and private property ownership that the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment cases have strove to protect.  Because without Fourth 
Amendment protection, individuals’ chances at redress following an improper 
 
why.html (citing 23andMe CEO, who explains that test sales are down and that “privacy is top of 
mind”). 
 202 See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (declaring that “silent 
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure” that first enable “illegitimate and 
unconstitutional practices” can only be obviated by “adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions 
for the security of person and property should be liberally construed”). 
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police search are slim to none,
203
 an added consequence of recognizing limited 
property rights in genetic information may be that law enforcement personnel 
acting in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement face 
greater liability for their actions by means of the exclusionary rule. 
There is no doubt that genetic information has great potential to help law 
enforcement agents fulfill their duty to keep society safe, and that many, if not 
most, companies trading in genetic information intend to do so for reasons 
that ultimately benefit society, such as medical research.  But no matter how 
well-meaning the police and corporations may be, it is crucial that courts do 
their duty to safeguard individuals’ constitutional rights204 and encourage police 
and legislators to craft responsible, transparent policy regarding these powerful 
new surveillance technologies. 
 
 203 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The only remaining 
remedy, if exclusion of the evidence is not required, is an action of trespass . . . . Mr. Justice Murphy 
showed how onerous and difficult it would be for the citizen to maintain that action and how meagre 
the relief even if the citizen prevails.  The truth is that trespass actions against officers who make 
unlawful searches and seizures are mainly illusory remedies.”). 
 204 See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 172 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Stooping to 
questionable methods neither enhances that respect for law which is the most potent element in law 
enforcement, nor, in the long run, do such methods promote successful prosecution.”). 
